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Using the context of race-conscious admissions programs in public schools,
this Note confronts the dilemmas for progressive attorneys created when mi-
nority plaintiffs bring equal protection challenges to race-conscious programs.
This Note first reviews the rationales for colorblind equal protection doctrine.
It then illustrates that in interracial equal protection conflicts, the doctrine
ignores the difference between various minority groups' experiences of acial
discrimination and positions their interests against one another. As a result,
one minority group achieves its gains at the cost of other minority groups.
In this Note, the author argues that Asian-American plaintiffs should avoid
the consequences of colorblind doctrine. This Note discusses Professor Eric
Yamamoto's "critical race praxis" as a means for minority plaintiffs and
their lawyers to craft a more nuanced approach to interracial conflict, despite
the limitations of colorblind doctrine. This Note concludes by suggesting
three practical strategies for implementing critical race praxis in interracial
conflicts: discussing a series offormative questions for attorneys and clients;
using antisubordination principles when selecting the specific practices to
challenge; and employing the educative function of briefs and other legal
memoranda.
INTRODUCTION
Racial justice is an intensely practical as well as theoretical concern. Without
some connection to a core sense ofjustice, law cannot have legitimacy. So we
should strive to identify and ameliorate the sources of the disconnect between
law and racial justice, between civil rights practice and critical race theory.1
In the fall of 2000, twenty public schools in the San Francisco
Unified School District (SFUSD) began the academic year with stu-
dent populations dominated by a single ethnic group as a result of a
court-ordered race-neutral admissions policy.2 For the previous fif-
I Keith Aoki & Margaret Chon, Critical Race Praxis and Legal Scholarship, 5 Micti. J.
RACE & L. 35, 52 (1999).
2 Nanette Asimov, 20 S.F. Schools Resegregate, Report Says, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 1, 2000, at
A13; Ryan Kim, Racial Clusters in S.F. School Admissions, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 1, 2000, at A7.
In its 1999-2000 Annual Report discussing its progress towards desegregation, the
SFUSD described the impact of the race-neutral student assignment plan for the 2000-2001
school year:.
The use of this (race-neutral assignment] plan has caused the level of racial
imbalance in the District at the school level to increase. In addition, the
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teen years, the SFUSD had been operating under a highly-touted de-
segregation consent decree that maintained a racial balance in each
school.3 The District implemented its new race-neutral plan following
a lawsuit by Chinese-American students, which alleged that the De-
cree's strict racial quotas denied them admission to selective magnet
schools on the basis of race.4 During settlement negotiations, the Chi-
nese-American plaintiffs refused to accept race as an admission factor
under any circumstance. 5 As a consequence of the race-neutral plan
the District's Lowell High School, one of the country's most prestigi-
ous public schools,6 offered admission to only 13 black and 40 Latino
incoming classes at several schools are marked by the highest levels of racial
isolation in many years, suggesting a likelihood of accelerated resegrega-
tion if this student assignment plan were continued without modification.
SAN FANucisco UNIFIED SCHOOL Dmxmcr, 1999-2000 CoxsE.-r DEcREE ANNL 'L Ri'on-r,
ExEcu- vE SusNsARy 2 (2000), available at http://ww.sfusd.kl2.ca.us/indexl.html (Aug.
1, 2000). In April 2001 the SFUSD reported a decade-long trend of increasing racial imbal-
ance in its schools:
From Fall 1993 to the present, the number of schools wvith high concentra-
tions of one racial or ethnic group (45% or higher) increased each year-
from 9 schools in Fall 1993, to 19 schools in 1995, to 28 schools in 1997, to
34 schools in 1998, and to 48 schools this past fall.
SAN FRANCisco UNIFIED SCHOOL Disrimc'r, Exc.ELLENcE FOR ALL: A FivE-YLn Co.wr.ws-
slVE PLAN TO ACHIEVE EDUCATIONAL EQurr" IN THE S.N F,&iuxsco UNIFIE SctiOOL DLs-
Tmcr, ExEc' ivE Su.wNtv 5 (2001) [hereinafter F.xcELLENCE FOR ALL].
3 SeeS.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist, 576 F. Supp. 34, 36 (N.D. Cal. 1983), rev.d,
896 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1990) ("To understand... the Decree one must have some insight
into the enormous effort exerted not only by the parties themselves .... but also by the best
experts on desegregation in the country. .. ."); see also Haeryung Shin, Note, Safeto in
Numbers? Equal Protection, Desegregation, and Discrimination: School Desegregation in a Multi-
Cultural Sociey, 82 CORNELL L REv. 182, 185 (1996) ("San Francisco's Consent Decree
stood as a shining example of cooperation, dedication, and sensitivity .... (Tihe Decree
has been hailed as 'one of the nation's most far-reaching school desegregation plans' and
'has been held up as a national model for achieing integration... .'" (footnote omitted)).
The court-appointed committee that drafted the Decree included Harold Howe I and
Gary A. Orfield, both nationally respected education policy experts with extensive govern-
ment, administrative, and academic experience. See S.F. NAACP, 576 F. Supp. at 52, 64--65.
4 Ho ex rel. Ho v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist, 965 F. Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1997), appeal
dismissed 147 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 1998).
5 See David I. Levine, The Cinese American Challenge to Court-Mandated Quotas in San
Francisco's Public Schools: Notes from a (Partisan) Paricipant-Observer, 16 LFuLt. BltxL wYrrEn
LJ. 39, 96 (2000) (noting that "the Ho plaintiffs were adamant in their desire to eliminate
the racial classification scheme"); see also Ryan Kim, Foe Blasts Schools' New Admission Plan,
S.F. ExmsN'E, Nov. 25, 1999, at Al ("[Attorney David Levine, who represented the Ho
plaintiffs,] blasted a new enrollment plan submitted Wednesday by San Francisco public
schools officials, saying it still includes race as a criterion and is, therefore, illegal."). The
court-approved settlement forced the District to adopt a race-neutral plan in compliance
with the Supreme Court's recent colorblind equal protectionjurisprndence. See infra note
11 (discussing the Court's "colorblind analysis" of race-conscious programs); ef. Nanette
Asimov, S.F District OKs Race-Neutral Sdool Plan, S.F. CHRoN.,Jan. 7, 2000, at A19 (stating
that courts across the country were mandating race-neutral plans).
6 See, &.g, Caitlin M. Liu, Recent Development, Beyond Blad and |l7ite: Chinese Are a-
cans Challenge San Franciscos Desegregation Plan, 5 AsiAN, LJ. 341, 342 (1998) (describing
Lowell as "[o]ne of the most famous and prestigious public high schools in the United
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students out of a total of 861 offers for fall 2000. 7 At Lowell, offers to
black and Latino students declined dramatically under the race-neu-
tral plan: dropping over 50% in 1999, the first year the plan applied,
and an additional 15% in 2000.8 These figures are particularly troub-
ling because SFUSD is one of the most ethnically and racially diverse
districts in the United States.9
Commentators disagree about whether the Lowell litigation rep-
resents the success of the Supreme Court's race-neutral equal protec-
tion jurisprudence' ° or the failure of constitutional colorblindness in
a multiracial society." The Supreme Court asserts that a race-neutral
standard successfully avoids the difficulty of legally defining "benign"
remedies and "minority" races,12 prohibits government reliance upon
racial stereotypes,' 3 and prevents racial classifications from increasing
racial hostilities.' 4 Although the Supreme Court has not squarely ad-
dressed the question of minority challenges to race-conscious pro-
States"); Elaine Woo, Caught on the Wrong Side of the Line?, L.A. Tu IEs, July 13, 1995, at Al
(discussing Lowell's reputation and achievements).
Lowell High School is an "academic 'alternative' high school," or magnet school, that
"admits students based on a combination of grades and test scores." Ho, 965 F. Supp. at
1319 n.2.
7 Julian Guthrie, Race Gap to Widen Further at Lowell Next Year: Fewer Bladis and Latinos,
More Asians and Whites, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 10, 2000, at Al.
8 Id.
9 See Asimov, supra note 2.
10 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 5, at 132 (stating that the Lowell litigation was an effort
to ensure that the school district took a neutral approach to race and ethnicity).
In E.g., Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theomy and Political Lavering Prac-
tice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MIcH. L. Rv. 821, 826 (1997); Alexandra Natapoff, Note,
Trouble in Paradise: Equal Protection and the Dilemma of Interminority Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 1059, 1059-62 (1995).
In the context of equal protection jurisprudence, a "colorblind analysis" refers to the
Supreme Court's application of strict scrutiny review to race-conscious programs intended
to benefit racial minorities. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (subjecting university's race-conscious special admissions program to
strictjudicial scrutiny); see also infra Part IA-B (reviewing the development of colorblind
jurisprudence and outlining its primary rationales). Some Justices characterize this analy-
sis as "colorblind" because it interprets the Equal Protection Clause as embodying a neutral
nondiscrimination principle applicable to every person regardless of their race or ethnic.
ity. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521-22 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also Laurence H. Tribe, "In What Vision of the Constitution
Must the Law Be Color-Blind?" 20J. MASmHALL L. REV. 201, 203 (1986) (offering a critical
analysis of the argument that the Equal Protection Clause is race neutral) .
An alternative approach, proposed by numerous critical race theorists, involves a
race-conscious" analysis that takes into account the historical and present-day status of
various racial groups when determining the constitutionality of racial classifications. See
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,"44 STAN. L. Rv. 1, 6-7 (1991)
(asserting that colorblindness fails to take into account the "complex historical and social
implications" underlying race status); infra Part L.C (discussing critical race theorists' criti.
ques of constitutional colorblindness).
12 See infta Part I.B.1.
13 See infra Part I.B.2.
14 See infra Part I.B.3.
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grams, 15 advocates of racial neutrality frequently invoke the Asian-
American model-minority myth, or the Lowell situation itself, to illus-
trate the costs race-conscious programs impose upon Asian
Americans. 16
This Note rejects these rationales for race neutrality and instead
agrees with the analysis of critical race theory scholars that the doc-
trine of colorblindness fails to achieve interracial justice because it
adopts an ahistorical, formal definition of race.' 7 As a result, color-
blind analysis has repeatedly failed to distinguish between minority
15 This Note refrains from using the phrase "affirmative action." This phrase first
appeared in President Lyndon B. Johnson's 1965 executive order requiring government
contractors to "take affirmative action to ensure" nondiscrimination based upon race,
creed, color, sex, or national origin. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965),
reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note (1994). President Johnson's encouraging
phrase attached a name to the concept of implementing change. Yet, in subsequent years
the phrase acquired a negative connotation due to the fact that debates about "affirmative
action" remain quite entrenched in longstanding racial fear and distrust. See Corinne E.
Anderson, Comment, A Current Perspeieth, The Erosion of Affinnath'e Action in University Ad-
missions, 32 AKRON L R. 181, 181"82 (1999) (discussing various negative connotations of
"affirmative action"); see also CRmnax.L RACE THEORY, at xxix (Kimberl Crenshaw et al. eds.,
1995) (arguing that "Critical Race Theory... provides a basis for understanding affirma-
tive action as something other than 'racial preference' (a notion whose implicit premise is
that affirmative action represents a deviation from an otherwise non.racial neutrality)").
The alternative phrase "race-conscious program" refers both to the reality that our society
is race conscious as well as to the program's remedial objective to correct historic and
institutionalized racism.
Race-conscious admissions programs have a variety of structures. For an explanation
of these programs, see David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affrnnatir'e Action, 23
HASrINGs CONsr. LQ. 921, 926-33 (1996). Professor Oppenheimer describes "five meth-
ods of race- and gender-conscious practices which are covered under tie umbrella of af-
firmative action: (1) quotas, (2) preferences, (3) self-studies, (4) outreach and counseling,
and (5) anti-discrimination." Id at 926.
The use of race as a selection criterion in university admissions programs is currently
subject to much academic debate. Comparerl~iLuim G. BowEN & DEREK BoK, TLE SIA.PE OF
THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUFNCES OF CONSIDERING R.%CE IN COLLEGE ANO UnIvEnsrrv
AmussIoNs (1998) (compiling a comprehensive, long-range study of tie use of race as a
selection criterion in higher education and concluding that race-conscious admissions pro-
grams foster a beneficial learning environment for all students and lead to higher levels of
success among African-American students), and Linda F. Nightman, The Threat to Ditersiy
in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of tle Conscquences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in
Law School AdmEssi= Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L RLr.v 1 (1997) (supporting the use of race as a
selection factor in law school admissions), with ST'A.' TERL'.sTROmm & AnIQUIL TEr,_-
smXOm, A.NmrucA ro BLACK AND WHITE 391-422 (1997) (asserting that race-based preferential
admissions policies harm African-American students by encouraging universities to accept
students who are academically underprepared).
16 See, eg., THERNSTROm & THERNSTROM, supra note 15, at 535-37 (highlighting Asian
Americans' "spectacular economic and social mobility" and "strildng success" long "before
government began to pursue color-conscious policies to benefit racial minorities");
Michael Omi & Dana Y. Takagi, SituatingAsian Americans in the Political Discourse on Aflrma-
tive Action, in RAcE AND REPRESENTATION AFFIR.MA\TIVE ActnoN 271, 27--74 (Robert Post &
Michael Rogin eds., 1998) (describing the "social construction" in which -'(p]referential
policies' victimized Asian American as much as, perhaps more than, whites").
17 See infra Part I.C.1.
CORNELL LAW REVfEW [Vol. 86:1283
groups' competing discrimination claims 8 and has exacerbated inter-
racial animosity.19 No other situation crystallizes the failure of consti-
tutional colorblindness and the dilemma it creates for minority
plaintiffs more than the Lowell litigation.
Scholars have not responded effectively to the failure of constitu-
tional colorblindness to resolve interracial conflicts.20 Specifically,
they have not offered a legal argument in response to the assertion
that race-conscious admissions programs are unconstitutional because
the programs benefit some minorities, namely blacks and Latinos,
while harming another racial minority, Asian Americans, along with
whites.21 On the one hand, prominent defenders of race-conscious
admissions programs have constructed a legally viable diversity ratio-
nale to support these programs for African Americans and Latinos. 22
18 See, e.g., De Grandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. 1550, 1578-80 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (re-
jecting Voting Rights Act challenge to Florida Senate redistricting plan brought by black
and Hispanic voters where remedies sought by each group would be mutually exclusive),
af'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997
(1994); S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34, 49-50 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(approving desegregation decree though it did not "address separately the specific needs
of every racial/ethnic group comprising the plaintiff class"), rev'd on other grounds, 896 F,2d
412 (9th Cir. 1990).
19 See infra Part I.D.4 (discussing the racial tensions among San Francisco's minority
communities in the wake of the Lowell litigation and the implementation of the race-
neutral admissions plan).
20 This Note adopts the language used by Professor Eric Yamamoto to describe race
relations:
I use the word interracial narrowly... to denote relations among nonwhite
racial groups, and by nonwhite racial groups I mean groups or communities
of color. Those commonly recognized racial groups include African Ameri-
cans, Asian Americans, and Native Americans (including Native
Hawaiians). I also treat Latinas/os as a racial group, even though His-
panic/Latina/o has been defined by the U.S. Census and other legal direc-
tives as an ethnic group (racially either white or nonwhite). By doing so, I
am acknowledging the social and political construction of racial and ethnic
categories. For this reason, I also recognize the significance of white as a
racial category and use the term multiracial to denote interactions among
racial groups, including white Americans.
ERIc K. YAMAioTo, INTERRAcIAL JusTIcE: CONFLICr AND REcoNcILTION IN POST"CIVIL
RIGH-TS AAERICA 281 n.1 (1999) (citations omitted).
21 See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
Proponents of colorblindness further assert that even if a court distinguishes white
Americans from nonwhite racial minorities, the court has no principled means of weighing
different racial minority groups' competing discrimination claims. See, e.g., De Grandy, 815
F. Supp. at 1578-80 (denying a remedy when both African-American and Latino communi-
ties presented mutually exclusive and colorable claims under the Voting Rights Act); see
also Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on The Shape of the River, 46
UCLA L. REv. 1583, 1629 (1999) (book review) ("Furthermore, it is not only whites who
are excluded when blacks and Hispanics are admitted to schools by racial double stan-
dards.... The cost of racial double standards in admissions is currently being paid by
many Asian students. When preferences are eliminated, they derive the greatest benefit.").
22 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-20 (1978) (plurality
opinion) (Powell,J.); BOWEN & Box, supra note 15, at 279-80 (concluding that an empirical
foundation exists for the diversity rationale justifying race-conscious programs); see also De-
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Although this rationale may survive strict scrutiny,2 critics note that
the decision not to address these programs' impact upon Asian Ameri-
cans leaves race-conscious admissions supporters' legal argument vul-
nerable to the criticism that the Court must still weigh the harm to
one minority group against the benefit to another minority group in
order to justify the race-conscious program, 24 a course courts have
been reluctant to take even in the remedial context.2
On the other hand, those critical race theorists whose work di-
rectly addresses questions of interracial conflict and race conscious-
ness frequently discuss only the academic, political, or social impact of
these issues.26 Critical race theory has been "challenging racial ortho-
doxy, shaking up the legal academy, questioning comfortable liberal
premises, and leading the search for new ways of thinking about our
nation's most intractable, and insoluble, problem-race."17 Yet some
commentators have noted that this scholarship's outright rejection of
our system of civil rights law has resulted in a gap between the aspira-
fendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Renewed Motion for SummaryJudgment at
36-43, Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 97CV75928-DT, 2001 WL 293196 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27,
2001) (stating that the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy fully com-
plies with the standards set forth in Bakke).
23 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 (plurality opinion) (Powell,J.) (stating that "the attain-
ment of a diverse student body" is "cearly... a constititutionally permissible goal for an
institution of higher learning"); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting,
in agreement with the district court's ruling in Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D.
Mich. 2000), that "Supreme Court precedent does not bar courts from considering diver-
sity as a compelling state interest"); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200-
01 (9th Cir. 2000) ("For now, therefore, it ineluctably follows that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment permits University admissions programs which consider race for other than remedial
purposes, and educational diversity is a compelling governmental interest that meets the
demands of strict scrutiny of race-conscious measures."), ert. deied, 69 U.S.LWI. 3593
(U.S. May 29, 2001) (No. 00-1341); Gratz,. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811,827-31 (distin-
guishing university's race-conscious admissions program from program invalidated in
Bakke).
24 See, ag., THimY.sTRo t & THiERNSTROM, supra note 15, at 400 (describing the tension
between "engineering racial balance" to increase diversity and prohibiting discrimination
against Asian Americans because "Asian Americans are so overrepresented at many elite
schools that their presence actually reduces diversity"); Selena Dong, Note, "Too Many
Asians": The Challenge of FiglaingDiscrimination Against Astan-Ainei*ans and PresmringAffnra-
tive Action, 47 STAN. L RE:v. 1027, 1045 (1995) (noting that Asian-American plaintiffs chal-
lenging race-conscious admissions programs may argue that"the goal of div ersity can never
supercede the Constitutional imperative against disadvantaging indiFiduals on the basis of
race"); see also Omi & Takagi, supra note 16, at 275-76 (discussing the detrimental conse-
quences of progressive analyses of affirmative action that ignore Asian Americans).
25 See, e.g., De Grandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. at 1578-80.
26 The emerging critical Asian legal scholarship is illustrative. See, e.g., Ron- S.
CHANG, Disomra_.D: AsiAN A.smmcAs, LXXw, AND ThE Nno-STTE 59 (1999)
("[T]raditional civil rights work, while providing some important benefits, will ultimately
be unable to meet the needs of Asian Americans because of its unequal coverage and
theoretical problems.").
27 Richard Delgado, Introduction to CRaIcxI. RAcE THEORy: THE CtrMNr. EDGF at Xiii,
xiii (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
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tional, oppositional wisdom of critical race theory and the struggles of
practitioners in the trenches of civil rights litigation.28 As a result, the
wisdom of critical race theory is just beginning to meaningfully inform
contemporary civil rights litigation strategies.
This Note joins the voices of critical race scholars calling for aca-
demics to transform their wisdom into guidance for practitioners,2 9
Drawing upon the insights of critical race theory, this Note suggests
litigation strategies for practitioners seeking to achieve interracial jus-
tice within the current framework of constitutional colorblindness. - 0
These strategies urge attorneys who view the outcome of the SFUSD
litigation as a success to reconsider the wisdom of encouraging Asian-
American plaintiffs to challenge the constitutionality of race-conscious
programs. Simultaneously, this Note encourages progressive lawyers
to represent these Asian-American plaintiffs and to grapple with the
difficult challenges these plaintiffs raise.
This Note is divided into two main parts. Part I first discusses the
principal rationales behind constitutional colorblindness and critical
race theory's critiques of the doctrine. Part I then examines how the
Lowell litigation demonstrates the failure of constitutional colorblind-
ness to resolve interracial conflicts.
In Part II, this Note applies the insights of critical race theory to
the difficulties facing civil rights attorneys involved in minority chal-
lenges to race-conscious programs. Part II concludes by offering three
practical strategies for framing and conducting challenges to race-con-
scious admissions programs in public schools. These strategies strive
to prohibit discrimination against Asian Americans while preserving
race-conscious admissions programs for other minority groups as well
as Asian Americans in other contexts. The first strategy involves a se-
ries of formative questions for attorneys to explore with minority cli-
ents to appropriately identify which specific practices the plaintiffs
28 E.g., Yamamoto, supra note 11, at 873-75, 882-89 (discussing the need to develop
practical ways in whcih lawyers can use the courts to resolve interracial conflict and achieve
interracial justice).
29 E.g., YAmAmOTO, supra note 20, at 129; Yamamoto, supra note 11, at 875; cf. Bill Ong
Hing, In the Interest of Racal Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to WorkJ for the Common Good,
47 STAN. L. REV. 901,916-17 (1995) (outlining positive litigation strategies for lawyers work-
ing on cases involving racial conflict); Levine, supra note 5, at 138 (noting that Professor
Yamamoto does not explain how ideas from critical race theory "could have been realisti-
cally employed to solve the problem in San Francisco" arising from the Lowell litigation).
30 Professor Richard Delgado acknowledges that we must decide "whether our system
of civil rights law needs a complete overhaul, as the [critical race theory] writers argue, or
just a minor tune-up-and if the former, whether the (critical race theorists'] suggestions
are good places to start." Delgado, supra note 27, at xv; see also Kim Forde-Mazrui, The
Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEo. L.J. 2331, 2337 (2000)
(discussing the need to "develop arguments for upholding race-neutral affirmative action"
programs that "take existing doctrine seriously" and "have a realistic chance of success in
the courts").
[Vol. 86:12831290
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wish to challenge and to educate the clients regarding the conse-
quences of their choices. The second strategy challenges systemic ra-
cism using a litigation model that shifts the focus of the suit from an
effort to secure public educational opportunities only for the individ-
ual plaintiffs to an effort to challenge the limited availability of re-
sources for all students. The third strategy involves the use of briefs
and other court filings by minority clients and their attorneys to em-
phasize the present-day impact of historical legal disenfranchisement
of Asian Americans, Latinos, and blacks, which could justify race-con-
scious remedies consistent with a colorblind framework. This Note
concludes that although "the potential for social change through liti-
gation is limited,"31 critical race theorists cannot abandon the court-
room in their efforts to transform the inspiring visions of critical race
praxis into daily tools for achieving social justice.32
I
EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYssIS AND RACE-NELUTRAL Doal,,'E
A. The Evolution of Race-Neutral Equal Protection Doctrine
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."33 In some of the earliest cases considering the constitutionality
of racial classifications, the Supreme Court declared that these classifi-
cations are inherently suspect under the Equal Protection Clause.34
As a result, the Court reviews these classifications under strict scru-
tiny, which "serves to insure against the risk that a racial classification
was motivated by an impermissible racial purpose."35 Under a strict-
31 Kevin R.Johnson, Lauoyeringfor Social Changr I~tt's a Law'er to Do?, 5 Mcu.J. R,cn
& L 201, 206 (1999).
32 Although the custom of student note writing places great emphasis upon the stu-
dent author's anonymity, I am persuaded by the tradition in critical race theory that ac-
knowledges the importance and influence of how a person is situated in society. My desire
to see critical race praxis assist lawyers in achieving socialjustice is very much grounded in
my experience as a race-conscious, nonblack, woman of color.
In many traditions, a person's name tells her story. in Hindi "Gitanjali" means a collec-
tion of poems or songs, and is an appropriate description of my background. I am South
Asian and was born and adopted in the Unites States by an Anglo family. My curious name
is a result of taking my Latina partner's last name as my family name. From my perspec-
tive, the world is far more complicated than a black-and-white paradigm. And, most impor-
tanty, the dynamics of racial prejudice are far more complex in a multimcial world still
desperate for radaljustice.
33 U.S. Cos'l". amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth Amendment provides similar protections
against racial classifications by the federal government: "No person shall... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ... " U.S. Co.wS. amend. V; Boilingv .
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (concluding that the due process obligations of the
federal government under the Fifth Amendment not to discriminate on the basis of race
carry the same force as the states' obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment).
34 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499.
35 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 30, at 2359.
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scrutiny analysis, the Court first considers whether a compelling gov-
ernment interest exists for establishing the racial classification, , 6 and
second, whether the racial classification is narrowly tailored to meet
that interest. 37
Historically, the Supreme Court applied strict-scrutiny analysis to
identify state laws that disenfranchised racial minorities.33 Through a
series of decisions beginning with Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke 9 and culminating in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,40 the
Court has concluded that the protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments provide that "any person, of whatever race, has the right
to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution
justify" under the strictest judicial scrutiny "any racial classification
subjecting that person to unequal treatment.' 41 The Court has made
clear that any racial classification implicates the Equal Protection
Clause, regardless of whether that classification harms minorities
through invidious racial discrimination or benefits minorities through
race-conscious programs. 42 The application of strict scrutiny to any
race-conscious remedy, or to "benign" racial classifications, has come
to embody the modern understanding of constitutional
colorblindness.
36 See id. at 2338 n.23. The Court has declared that states have a compelling govern.
mental interest in correcting the present-day effects of past or present racial discrimina.
tion. E.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989) (plurality
opinion) ("[T]he States and their subdivisions may take remedial action when they possess
evidence that their own spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimina-
tion . . ."). However, the Court has been reluctant to recognize other compelling govern.
ment interests that justify racial classifications. In particular, the Court has rejected the
assertion that remedying societal discrimination is sufficient to justify a race-conscious re-
medial program. Id. at 505 (plurality opinion); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
307-10 (1978); see also Lino A. Graglia, The "Remedy" Rationale for Requiring or Permitting
Otherwise Prohibited Discrimination: How the Court Overcame the Constitution and the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 22 SuroLK U. L. REv. 569, 615 (1988) (discussing Justice Scalia's rejection of
remedying societal discrimination as a permissible equal protection goal); Kent D. Lollis,
Strict or Benign Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause: Troublesome Areas Remain, 35 Sr.
Louis U. L.J. 93, 100 (1990) (discussingJustice Powell's reasoning that remedying societal
discrimination is impermissible).
Although the lower federal courts are divided over the question of whether an educa-
tional institution's interest in providing a diverse learning environment constitutes a com-
pelling governmental interest, many commentators anticipate that recent litigation over
the University of Michigan undergraduate and law school race-conscious admission pro-
grams could compel the Court to answer this question. SeeJodi Wilgoren, U.S. Court Bars
Race as Factor in School Entry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2001, at Al.
37 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 30, at 2338 n.23.
38 E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1954); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
39 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
40 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
41 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224.
42 See, e.g., City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (plurality opinion);
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273 (plurality opinion).
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B. Principal Rationales for Constitutional Colorblindness
The Court has offered three principal rationales for applying a
strict-scrutiny analysis to benign racial classifications. In addition, the
Court has asserted that underlying each of its rationales is a funda-
mental concern with justice and fairness for protecting the personal
rights of individual citizens.
1. Definitional Problems Beyond Judicial Competence: "Benign" and
"Invidious" Classifications, "Minority" and "Majority"
Racial Groups
First, without strict-scrutiny analysis, the difficulty of defining the
purpose of a racial classification 43 or of identifying the "minority"
race44 would run the risk of allowing a government to use an illegiti-
mate racial classification. 45 In Croson, the Court found that "[a]bsent
searching judicial inquiry into the justification for.., race-based mea-
sures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are
'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics."46
2. Race Neutrality Protects Against Government Use of Racial
Stereotypes
Second, the Court's colorblind approach prevents the use of ra-
cial stereotypes to justify government action.47 In the plurality opin-
ion in Bakke, Justice Powell expressed concern that "preferential
programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that cer-
43 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 n.*
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("It should be obvious
that every racial classification helps, in a narrow sense, some races and hurts others....
Accordingly, whether a law relying upon racial taxonomy is 'benign' or 'malign' either
turns on 'whose ox is gored' or on distinctions found only in the eye of the beholder."
(citations omitted)).
44 SeeBakke, 438 U.S. at 295-300 (plurality opinion) (PowelIj.). The plurality opinion
in Bakke expressly discussed the difficulties of applying constitutional protections based
upon membership in "majority" or "minority" racial groups rather than upon an individ-
ual's right to be free from any racial classification. Id. (plurality opinion) (Powell,J.). The
plurality stated that the "concepts of 'majority' and 'minority' necessarily reflect temporary
arrangements and political judgments" and thus provide "no principled basis for deciding
which groups would merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and which would not." Id. at
295-96 (plurality opinion) (Powell, J.). The plurality opinion further explained that the
"kind of variable sociological and political analysis necessary to produce such rankings sim-
ply does not lie within the judicial competence-even if they otherwise were politically
feasible and socially desirable." Id. at 297 (plurality opinion) (Powell,J.); smz also DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 337-40 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing the problems
in a multiracial society of basing racial classification upon membership in a minority
group), quoted in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297 n.37 (plurality opinion) (Powell, J.).
45 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion).
46 Id
47 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (plurality opinion) (Powell, J.).
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tain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection
based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth. '48 The
plurality opinion in Croson similarly explained that without " [p] roper
findings.., to define both the scope of the injury and the extent of
the remedy necessary to cure its effects," a risk exists "that a racial
classification is merely the product of unthinking stereotypes or a
form of racial politics." 49 Such stereotyping "reinforces the percep-
tion that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which they live-
think alike, [and] share the same... interests."50
3. Preventing Exacerbation of Racial Hostilities and Increase of
Racial Tensions
Finally, the Court has justified the use of a colorblind analysis to
prevent racial classifications from exacerbating racial hostilities or in-
creasing racial balkanization.51 Justice Scalia has warned that the
problem with a racial quota "'lies not in its name, but in its effects: a
quota is a divider of society, a creator of castes, and it is all the worse
for its racial base, especially in a society desperately striving for an
equality that will make race irrelevant.' ''52 One scholar has described
the Court's concern in terms of white citizens' resentment for bearing
the burdens of race-conscious programs: "Much of what causes resent-
ment along racial lines is the way in which race-operative affirmative
action appears to give preferential treatment to those who do not de-
serve it, relatively privileged racial minorities, and denies opportuni-
ties to materially disadvantaged persons, such as poor whites." 5
The Court has not completely adopted a colorblind principle and
has left open the possibility that, under some circumstances, it will
48 Id. (plurality opinion) (Powell, J.).
49 Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 516-17 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in thejudgment) ("There is a special irony in the stereotypical
thinking that prompts legislation of this kind. Although it stigmatizes the disadvantaged
class with the unproven change of past racial discrimination, it actually imposes a greater
stigma on its supposed beneficiaries.").
50 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (holding that North Carolina voters alleg
ing racial gerrymandering by the legislature stated a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause).
51 Id. at 64749; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion); id at 528 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298-99 (plurality opinion) (Powell,J.). Several
commentators have discussed the Court's focus on this concern. E.g., Forde-Mazrui, supra
note 30, at 2358; Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.: The Baddash
Against Affirmative Action, 64 TuL L. Rnv. 1609, 1622-23 (1990).
52 Croson, 488 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting ALEXAN.
DER M. BicKEL, THE MOPu-rv OF CONSENT 133 (1975)).
53 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 30, at 2358. For a responsive argument debunking the
myth that race-conscious programs deny lower-income whites opportunities for the benefit
of affluent minorities, see BowEsN & BoK, supra note 15, at 46-51.
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consider racial distinctions. Yet its equal protection doctrine has em-
braced a race-neutral, strict-scrutiny analysis thatJustice Marshall criti-
cized as "strict in theory, but fatal in fact."54
4. Underlying Concern for Protecting Individual Rights
In addition to strategizing within the confines of the Court's col-
orblind doctrine, scholars and attorneys must address the Court's em-
phasis upon protecting individual rights when adjudicating challenges
to race-conscious programs.55 The tension between a group rights-
based approach and an individual rights-based approach is most pro-
nounced in the context of race-conscious remedies. The Court has
integrated an individual-rights approach into its colorblind analysis,
asserting that racial classifications risk imposing burdens "upon indi-
vidual members of a particular group in order to advance the group's
general interest" 56 Under a colorblind analysis, the standard of re-
view is "not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by
a particular classification,"5 7 but depends upon every citizen's "'per-
sonal rights' to be treated with equal dignity and respect."58 Although
numerous advocates are creatively using reparations arguments to ad-
dress group-based wrongs,59 attorneys defending race-conscious pro-
54 Fullilove v. Klurznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment), overmed by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995). In
Adarand, the Court responded to Justice Marshall's criticism:
[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but
fatal in fact." The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the linger-
ing effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is
an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it.
Id. (citation omitted). Yet, a review of current case law shows that courts rarely frind a race-
conscious program that passes strict scrutiny.
55 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
56 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (plurality opinion) (Powell, J.); see also THEnxsmot &
TnzaxsTo.e, supra note 15, at 315 (recounting the childhood experiences of Sam
Fulwood, an African-American correspondent for the Los Angdes Tirnes, who did not wel-
come the news that "he had been picked by the principal to integrate the town's white
junior high school").
57 Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (plurality opinion); see id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
58 Id at 493 (plurality opinion); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 ("[A]l governmental
action based on race-a group classification long recognized as 'in most circumstances ir-
relevant and therefore prohibited'-should be subjected to detailedjudicial inquiry to en-
sure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed."
(citation omitted) (quoting Hiraba)ashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943), error
coram nobis granted by 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987))).
59 See, eg., Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Korcmatsu v.
United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Jack Hitt, Maldng the Case for Radal
Reparations, HARPER'S MAG., Nov. 2000, at 37.
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grams against challenges by minority plaintiffs cannot avoid working
within the limitations of an individual-rights approach. 60
C. Critical Race Theory Critiques of Constitutional
Colorblindness
By embracing constitutional colorblindness, both the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts have sidestepped the complicated
questions raised by interracial conflict.61 Under constitutional color-
blindness, courts avoid both the difficulty of weighing competing
claims of discrimination and the challenge of constructing a particu-
larized remedy that corrects the specific harm faced by a distinct mi-
nority group.62 According to critical race scholars, race-neutral
doctrine fails to resolve racial inequality in the context of interracial
conflicts for two primary reasons. 63 First, when courts use a race-neu-
tral standard to resolve interracial conflict, it results in the mainte-
nance of a legal system that systematically benefits whites over racial
minorities under the guise of neutrality.64 Second, critical race theo-
60 One significant issue this situation raises is the need for the attorney and client to
explore the balance between the individual benefit the plaintiff seeks and the cost of that
benefit to the larger group. Part I1.B discusses strategies that attempt to lessen this tension
by prompting the client either to reconsider whether the individual benefit is so great that
he or she is willing to compromise the group's right (which an individual litigant is often
willing to do) or, alternatively, to discover the overlapping interests of the client and the
group as a means of appealing to the client's self-interest.
61 See Natapoff, supra note 11, at 1060-62. Numerous scholars have examined the Su-
preme Court's current shift towards a doctrine of constitutional colorblindness in equal
protection cases. See, e.g., Frank R. Parker, TheDamaging Consequences of the Rehnquist Court's
Commitment to ColorBlindness Versus RacialJustice, 45 Am. U. L. REv, 763, 773 (1996) ("Color
blindness is a pathology, a disease of the eye. In striving for a color-blind society, the
Supreme Court is turning a blind eye to the gross racial inequities that pervade American
society and which, unless alleviated, deprive this country of any claim to racial justice.").
Ironically, it was an Asian American, Toyosaburo Korematsu, whose case expanded
this principle to include all races, not just African Americans. See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
62 See, e.g., S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34, 50 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(refusing to define specific remedies for particular minority groups), ren'd, 896 F.2d 412
(9th Cir. 1990).
For a historical example of the origins of the perception that all minorities are the
same, see Gong Lum v. Rice 275 U.S. 78, 82 (1927), cited in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 491 (1954), which described the "brown, yellow, and black races" as "colored" and the
opposite of the white race in a case involving a Chinese-American student suing for the
right to attend white segregated schools.
63 This Note focuses specifically on critical race theory's criticisms of race neutrality in
the context of interracial conflict. Numerous articles have discussed critical race theory's
more general criticisms of the impact of constitutional colorblindness upon conflicts be-
tween minorities and whites. See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 11.
64 Many, if not all, critical race theorists take the position that the U.S. legal institu-
tion systematically benefits whites. These theorists assert that early American legislators
and courts structured a legal system that resulted in the preservation of racial, gender,
class, and sexual-orientation subordination. For example, in the 1600s, property laws al-
lowed white men to exercise property rights over blacks and the value of their production,
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rists have described how the use of constitutional colorblindness to
resolve interracial conflicts creates a somewhat illusory success for a
victorious minority plaintiff. A minority group that successfully chal-
lenges the use of race-conscious programs in one context may eventu-
ally find itself unsuccessfully defending such a program in another
contexL65
1. The Not-So-Neutral Bias of Race Neutrality
According to critical race theorists, when plaintiffs of any race
invoke race-neutral equal protection doctrine to invalidate race-con-
scious programs-which schools, employers, and other institutions
implement to correct the historical exclusion of generations of minor-
ities-it results in minorities facing purportedly race-neutral laws
which render invisible systemic benefits to whites.66
For example, in Podberesky v. Kirwan,67 the Fourth Circuit struck
down the University of Maryland's Banneker scholarship program, a
merit-based program for African-American students.6s Daniel Podber-
esky challenged the program under the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause he met the academic and nonacademic requirements for the
Banneker scholarship but was unable to compete for it because he is
Latino. 69 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held the scholarship
program unconstitutional because no compelling state interest justi-
fied it,70 and even if such an interest existed, the university did not
narrowly tailor the program to meet it.7t As a result of Podberesky's
suit, the court enjoined the university from using race as a selection
criterion for its scholarships, 72 despite the existing racial hostility to-
See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Proper,, 106 -I.v. L RE%,. 1707, 1715-21 (1993). Later
inheritance laws permitted this ill-begotten wealth to be transferred from generation to
generation without ever addressing the original appropriation. Id. at 1729-31. Finally.
modem equal protection precedent forbids redistributing resources through affirmative
action to correct societal inequities. Id. at 1766-67. In this manner, the law makes systemic
inequality appear as a natural, or social, event that the law cannot redress. Id. at 176B. For
additional critical race theorists who expressly assert that the law s)stematically benefits
people who are white, see Derrick Bell, White Superioriy in Aneyica: Its Legal Legaty Its &co-
nomic Costs, 33 ViL.. L REv. 767, 774 (1988); Gotanda, supra note 11, at 36-37; Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, t1w Ego, and Equal Protection: Redoning with Unconscious Racism, 89
STAN. L. REv. 317, 350 (1987).
65 See infra Part I.C.2.
66 See Gotanda, supra note 11, at 16-17; infra text accompan)ing note 79.
67 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
68 Id. at 152, 161.
69 See id. at 152.
70 See id. at 155. The court found that present-day effects of past discrimination
against black students "do not necessarily implicate past discrimination on the part of the
university." Id. at 154.
71 See id. at 158-61.
72 See id at 162.
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wards black students on campus 73 and black students' under-
representation and higher attrition rates.74
The court also noted that Podberesky failed to qualify for the
University's unrestricted scholarship program, the Francis Scott Key
program, because his academic credentials were just below the Key
program's requirements. 75 However, unlike the Banneker program's
race-conscious criteria, Podberesky would not have been able to chal-
lenge the Key program's facially race-neutral requirements. Under
constitutional colorblindness, strict-scrutiny analysis prohibits reme-
dies for "societal," or systemic, discrimination. 7 6 Thus, strict-scrutiny
analysis would prohibit Podberesky from challenging on equal protec-
tion grounds the cultural bias in standardized tests and public educa-
tion that is at least partially responsible for the disproportionate
number of white students academically outperforming minority stu-
dents, including Latino students.77 As a result, the Francis Scott Key
73 See id. at 154.
74 See id. at 157-58. According to the district court, the Banneker program "help[ed]
to build a base of strong, supportive alumni, combat racial stereotypes and provide men-
tors and role models for other African-American students." The program also "serve[d] to
enhance [the university's] reputation in the African-American community, increase the
number of African-Americans students who might apply.. ., improve the retention rate of
those African-American students who are admitted and help ease racial tensions that exist
on the campus." Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1094-95 (D. Md. 1993), vacated,
38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
75 See Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 152.
76 See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v.Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion).
77 See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 956-57 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (finding that
standardized I.Q. tests administered to Californian students "were never designed to elimi.
nate cultural biases against black children; it was assumed in effect that black children were
less 'intelligent' than whites" and that the "tests were standardized and developed on an
all-white population, and naturally their scientific validity is questionable for culturally dif.
ferent groups"), affd in part and rev'd in part sub noam. arry P. ex rel. Lucille P. v. Riles, 793
F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984). See generally THERNSTROIM & THERNSrRO.I, supra note 15, at 348-
422 (proposing that lower expectations of African-American students contribute to their
lower performance on certain standardized tests); Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives
and Bias, 1 Am. U.J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 121 (1993) (discussing examples of cultural
and gender bias in testing questions on the Law School Admissions Test and its impact
upon law school admissions); Christopher Jencks, Racial Bias in Testing, in THE BtacI-
WHrrE Tnsr ScoRE GAP 55 (ChristopherJencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998) (describing
various types of bias inherent in cognitive tests); William C. Kidder, Portia Denied: Un-
masking Gender Bias on the LSAT and Its Relationship to Racial Diversity in Legal Education, 12
YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 1, 24 (2000) ("Possible forms of LSAT test bias linked to gender and
race/ethnicity include stereotype threat, speededness, differential guessing, subject matter
selection and item bias."); Michael T. Nettles et al., Race and Testing in College Admissions, in
CHILLING ADMISSIONS: THE AmRMATIvE ACTION CRISIS AND THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES
97, 106 (Gary Orfield & Edward Miller eds., 1998) (arguing that the test-score gap between
students of color and white students taking the SAT is due to "persisting inequalities in
precollege education" and "unequal access to test-specific preparation"); Roberto Rodri-
guez, Test-Driven Admissions: ETS Responds to Criticism of SATs, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER
EDuc., Sept. 5, 1996, at 7 (summarizing standardized-testing administrators' responses to
concerns that the tests are biased against racial minorities); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier,
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scholarship, a program that likely tends to benefit white students, re-
mained intact with an invisible bias, while the court struck down the
Banneker Program, a race-conscious program that altered the balance
of power between white and black students to address the legacy of
discrimination against black students.78
A similar phenomenon occurs with college admission programs
that employ race-conscious standards. Applying a race-neutral analy-
sis, courts strike down programs that attempt to redress the historical
discrimination against minorities through affimative action strate-
gies.79 Yet other permissible "'plus' categories" that admissions offices
use include "legacies,... musicians, and the geographically diverse"-
all categories which are disproportionately white.80 Described by
some as "'the oldest form of affirmative action,'" 8' the practice of leg-
acy admissions-favoring an applicant whose family members are
alumni-is perhaps the most objectionable category due to its racial
bias. 2 Nevertheless, this practice remains in place at numerous uni-
versities.83 A legacy admissions program favors white applicants be-
cause historical racial segregation and discriminatory policies
"ensured that elite institutions would be populated by whites whose
descendants are now benefitting."8 4
Even such seemingly innocuous university admissions criteria as
geographic diversity can contain racial bias.85 Many people of color
are concentrated in urban regions of the country from which colleges
receive greater numbers of applicants.86 As a result, a geographic di-
versity factor will rarely benefit minority applicants 7 but instead will
tend to help applicants living in less populated states or regions, who
The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Idza4 84 Cu.. L RPE,. 953, 982
(1996) (arguing that standardized tests cannot accurately assess an applicant's future per-
formance because of the racial, gender, and class bias of the tests).
William Bowen and Derek Bok point out that standardized-test scores may also "be
affected by the quality of teaching that applicants have received or even by kno%%ing the
best strategies for taking standardized tests, as coaching schools regularly remind students
and their parents." BoivEN & BoK, supra note 15, at 277.
78 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (referring to the present effects of
past discrimination at the university and the remedial benefits of the Banneker program).
79 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
80 CHANG, supra note 26, at 115.
81 Id. (quoting JOHN K. WnsoN, THE M -rH OF PoLTCAL CoRaEr.cmss THE CoN.
SERVATrVE ATrACK ON HIGHER EDUCATION 149 (1995)).
82 See id. at 114-16.
83 Id. at 116 (discussing Harvard University and Stanford University).
84 Id. at 115.
85 Id.
86 See Expert Report Submitted on Behalf of the University of Michigan, The Compel-
ling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (No. 97-CV-75231-Cr), reprinted asThomasJ. Sugrue, Evpert RIeprt, 5 Mia.J.
Rcu & L 261, 266-68 (1999).
87 See CHANG, supra note 26, at 155.
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in turn tend to be white. In the near future, the same "diversity" ratio-
nale that successfully justifies the use of geographic, musical, athletic,
or other facially nonracial criteria may also provide a legal justification
for the consideration of race as a "diversity" factor rather than as a
means to remedy the effects of present or historical racial
discrimination.88
Critical race theorists assert that the tendency of legal institutions
to systematically benefit whites is due in part to the ahistorical concep-
tion of race contained in race-neutral equal protection doctrine.
Within this framework, race is simply the color of an individual's skin,
disconnected from the historical, political, social, or cultural meaning
attached to race.89 Several conceptualizations of "race" exist but most
critical race theorists argue that when analyzing interracial conflict, it
is essential to view the position of minority groups relative to one an-
other, and to whites, with an understanding of history90 or, at a mini-
mum, with an understanding of race that takes into account the
existence of institutionalized racism.9' Although critical race theorists
argue that a historical conception of race could potentially allow racial
minorities to see the connections among their individual experiences
of oppression,92 these theorists rarely articulate a way for courts or
88 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
89 See, e.g., CHAN G, supra note 26, at 137-38; Gotanda, supra note 11, at 35-36. Conceiv-
ing race in its social context, numerous critical race theorists also reject the Supreme
Court's recent recognition of whites as an ethnic group that experiences racial discrimina-
tion in the same manner as racial minority groups. Professor Chang eloquently articulates
the shortcomings of applying an ahistorical racial analysis to conflicts between minorities
and whites:
Much is made today of the idea of color blindness, with the ghost of Martin
Luther King, Jr., invoked to provide legitimacy. But the idea that law is to
be neutral to race is over two hundred years too late. To institute color
blindness now is to render law incapable of redressing the sedimentation of
legalized racial injustice. To institute color blindness now without repara-
tions is to legitimize hundreds of years of violence wreaked on bodies of
color. It would leave intact accumulated white racial privilege and would
attempt to cover up, without healing, the racial sores that have been pro-
duced by the racist history of this nation.
CHANG, supra note 26, at 137-38.
90 See C -G, supra note 26, at 137-38; Lawrence, supra note 64, at 324.
91 See Gotanda, supra note 11, at 44; Lawrence, supra note 64, at 324-26. For example,
critical race theorists point to the existence of institutionalized racism as a historically
based justification for affirmative-action plans. See Gotanda, supra note 11, at 63 (calling
for a "revised approach to race [that] recognize[s] the systemic nature of subordination in
American society"); Harris, supra note 64, at 1715-16 (discussing the historical develop-
ment of "whiteness" and its accompanying entitlements); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Hsv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rrv. 323, 388-92 (1987)
(justifying affirmative action on the basis of remedying the appropriation of blacks' labor
which has gone uncorrected for generations).
92 See, e.g., CHANG, supra note 26, at 131-32 ("[We must develop a greater apprecia-
tion of the interconnectedness of different forms of oppression."). Professor Chang ar-
gues that a connective link does not appear to exist between Asian Americans and blacks
because we do not fully understand the history of or manner in which our society has
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practitioners to translate this sociopolitical argument into legal
doctrine.
In Podberesky, the failure of a race-neutral analysis to recognize the
distinct needs of various minority groups based upon their history of
subordination resulted in the maintenance of systemic privileges for
whites at the expense of minority groups.93 An alternative analysis
could have taken into account the fact that both Latino and black
students are underrepresented at the university due to a variety of his-
torical and modem factors. Rather than the complete elimination of
the Banneker scholarship program, the court or Podberesky could
have sought implementation of a similar program for Latino
students.94
2. The Illusory Success of Plaintiffs' Victories Under a Race-Aairal
Doctrine
Critical race theorists who have examined interracial conflict as-
sert that race-neutral analysis leads to illusory success for minority
plaintiffs challenging race-conscious programs because all minority
groups could benefit from race-conscious programs in some con-
text 95 Numerous studies have shown that no minority group has
achieved equality of outcome in every aspect of society compared ith
whites,96 implying that every minority group would eventually benefit
from a race-conscious program if it were available. An individual mi-
nority plaintiff who successfully challenges a race-conscious program
receives an immediate benefit in one context, but may later find her-
drawn the color line. I. at 126-27. Consequently, he calls for a more expansive temporal
framework that not only accounts for present-day conditions, but also incorporates histori-
cal discrimination and subordination. Id. at 47.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
94 Courts have consistently refused, however, to recognize that a race-conscious rem-
edy may need to "address separately the specific... needs of every racial/ethnic group" by
providing different race-conscious programs appropriate for various racial groups or, in
some cases, providing a race-conscious program only for those groups that uill prospec-
tively benefit from the program. S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34, 50
(N.D. Cal. 1983), rev'd, 896 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1990).
95 See infra note 96. Recent cases indicate that although minority plaintiffs are just
beginning to challenge race-conscious programs, these plaintiffs are very likely to succeed.
See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994); S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist.,
59 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1029-30 (N.D. Cal. 1999). No case has yet arisen in which a minority
plaintiff has challenged a permissible use of race, but one can speculate that in today's
judicial climate, if a race-conscious program has a negative effect upon another racial mi-
nority, a court may be more likely to find the program invalid.
96 SeeJames Jennings, The Interational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
dal Discrimination: Imp ikations for Chalenging Radal Hierarrhy, 40 How. LJ. 597, 600 (1997)
("[A] comprehensive assessment of race relations shows that racial divisions provide sys-
temic advantages to whites, at the expense of people of color, but especially blacks. The
distribution of economic, social, and cultural benefits in this nation reflects a well-in-
grained hierarchy based on race."). Jennings summarizes research concerning racial har-
assment and violence, as well as residential and employment segregation. Id. at 600-03.
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self regretting the lack of race-conscious programs in another
context.97
For example, in the Lowell High School litigation discussed be-
low in Part I.D, the plaintiffs opposed the use of race-conscious admis-
sions programs in public magnet schools because they viewed these
programs as denying opportunities to Chinese-American applicants in
favor of less-deserving black or Latino applicants. 98 Yet supporters of
the program warned that these same Chinese-American students may
find themselves facing significant racial discrimination and barriers
when they leave an academic setting and move into the workplace-
an environment in which Asian Americans face express and implicit
racial or cultural discrimination preventing their advancement and
limiting their opportunities. 99 Under these circumstances, an individ-
ual who once challenged the use of race-conscious programs may sub-
sequently appreciate the role these programs play in overcoming
racial subordination.
As in the Lowell litigation and Podberesky, when a minority plain-
tiff embraces a race-neutral standard, she is likely to view a race-con-
scious program benefitting another minority group as the source of
her racial subordination. Constitutional colorblindness does not offer
this plaintiff a means for challenging the subtle (or not-so-subtle) ra-
cial bias in facially neutral programs.' 00 When a plaintiff successfully
challenges the program, all minority groups then suffer the loss of
race-conscious strategies for addressing systemic discrimination. 01
These effects illustrate the difficulty of addressing competing claims of
discrimination under current jurisprudence without deepening inter-
racial tensions and concealing systemic benefits for whites. 10 2
97 See infra Part I.D.4.
98 See infra Part I.D.3.
99 See infra Part I.D.4.
100 See supra Part I.C.1.
101 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
102 See, e.g., Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African Americani
Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles", 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1581, 1584-85
(1993) (describing how the "master narrative of white supremacy" limited the narrative of
the conflict between Korean Americans and African Americans in Los Angeles). Ikemoto
states that:
The notion of a Korean American/African American conflict [during the
1992 Los Angeles riots] locates the causes of the uprisings in problems
originating within and bounded by communities of color. At the same
time, the rubric of race and racism used to describe the conflict is legalistic;
it focuses on intent and attributes racism to wrong-minded individuals.
This denies the possibility of embedded, culture-wide racism. It makes race
fungible and independent of the history of racial subordination in the
United States. And it distances the problem of intergroup conflict from the
dominant society; the problem is defined as one of race. This distinguishes
race from whiteness.
Id. at 1593 (footnote omitted).
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D. The San Francisco Unified School District
From one perspective, a minority plaintiffs constitutional chal-
lenge to a race-conscious program fits neatly within the Court's tradi-
tional strict-scrutiny analysis. From another perspective, one can ask if
such a claim should fit so neatly. Perhaps, as some scholars have ar-
gued, minorities' competing claims of discrimination reveal the inade-
quacies of constitutional colorblindness and provide an opportunity
to challenge the legitimacy of the doctrine itself.103
However, this second perspective raises a number of questions.
Are the claims of minority plaintiffs such as Daniel Podbereksy sub-
stantially different from similar challenges brought by white plaintiffs
such as Allan Bakke? Does a minority plaintiffs challenge have a dif-
ferent constitutional, legal, political, or social impact? Do unique con-
cerns arise under these circumstances that civil rights lawyers should
consider? These questions dominate legal scholars' and practitioners'
reactions to the Lowell litigation.
The litigation over admissions policies in the San Francisco Uni-
fied School District discussed in this subpart raises questions about the
consequences of the Chinese-American plaintiffs' decision to embrace
a race-neutral approach. The aftermath of the Lowell litigation dem-
onstrates the need for minority plaintiffs and their attorneys to de-
velop new litigation approaches to interracial conflict over race-
conscious programs.
1. "The Oldest Public High School in the W1est' 104
Lowell High School, in the troubled SFUSD, 05 is one of the old-
est and most preeminent public high schools in the country.'06 It of-
fers students of all races from middle- and working-class families the
opportunity for an exceptional education and an increased likelihood
of admission to a prestigious college.'0 7 Most recently, Lowell has gar-
nered attention for being at the center of the controversy over the
103 See supra Part .C (discussing critical race theorists' criticisms of race-ncutral equal
protection doctrine).
104 LowEu.uALUMNI OuncE, LoEiX.LL ALTMNI AssocLrno, at littp://v.%w.loiwcllalumni.
org (last modifiedJune 2000).
105 See Shin, supra note 3, at 184 (quoting a newspaper article describing Lowell as 'a
desirable intellectual oasis in a state whose academic performance routinely ranks among
the worst in the nation").
106 See Woo, supra note 6. Lowell's distinguished alumni include former California
Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr., naturalist Dian Fossey. sculptor Alexander Calder, Nobel
laureate physicist Albert Michelson, and United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen G.
Breyer. Liu, supra note 6, at 342 n.9; Woo, supra note 6.
107 See Liu, supra note 6, at 342-43 ("Perhaps more important thant its hallowed history
is its top-notch academic environment viewed by many families, especially middle- and
working-class ones that cannot afford to send their children to private schools, as a gate%-uy
to four-year colleges and future success.").
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SFUSD's 1983 desegregation Consent Decree'08 involving a debate
about merit, 0 9 access, 110 race-conscious remedies,"' desegrega-
tion,112 and interracial conflict." 3
2. "Negative Action" Against Chinese-American Students
In 1983, the SFUSD implemented a desegregation Consent De-
cree in response to the San Francisco NAACP's suit to desegregate the
108 See infta Part I.D.2 (describing the Decree's origins and provisions).
109 Compare Statement by Amy Chang and Harrison Chow Before the San Francisco
Board of Education Meeting (May 11, 1993), in Editorial, A Lesson on Cheating at Lowell
High School AsLANWEEK, May 21, 1993, at 22 (describing the desegregation Consent Decree
as a "system of racial cheating" that admits students with lower test scores and excludes
Chinese Americans with higher test scores), andJulian Guthrie, 50% Drop in Blacks, Latinos
at Lowell, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 16, 1999, at Al (quoting the mother of Patrick Wong, one of
the Ho plaintiffs denied admission to Lowell, "Yes, there's now a drop in offers made to
blacks and Latinos. But offers should be made on merit. In the long range, when you
apply for a job, don't you think you should get it on merit?"), and Sen. Quentin L. Kopp,
Editorial, The War on Merit at Lowell High School AsIANWEEK, Feb. 25, 1994, at 19 (describing
the Decree's implementation at Lowell as attacking the "values of individual effort, hard
work, and merit"), andJulie D. Soo, Racial-Cap Suit Delayed Once Again, ASIANWEEl, Sept.
10, 1998, at 17 (quoting a Chinese-American parent as saying, "I also heard.., that Chl-
nese students needed to score higher to get in [to Lowell], higher than say African Ameri-
can or European students. I don't think that is fair... kids should be judged on their
score and performance, not on color of their skin" (second omission in original)), with
BOWEN & Bog, supra note 15, at 277 (suggesting an alternative definition of merit that
includes a student's potential for contributing to civic society rather than one limited to
numerical grades), and Note, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions Programs in
Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 112 HARv. L. REv. 940, 955-56 (1999) (arguing that
"students denied admission to elementary and secondary schools often have a lesser claim
to be entitled to admission based on 'merit'" than a student applying to college or gradu-
ate school who has "invested years of work in attaining grades and a record of extracurricu-
lar and other achievement"), and Viji Sundaram, EEOC Official: Affirmative Action Can End
Stereotyping, INDIA-WEST, Mar. 5, 1999, at A32 (quoting EEOC Vice Chairman Paul Igisaki as
saying it is difficult to "assess merit" because "standardized tests do not fairly treat Latino
Americans and African Americans"), and Bill Wong, Merit Myth, AsINWEEK, May 10, 1996,
at 6 (arguing for affirmative action because high scores alone should not determine merit
and the United States is not actually a meritocracy).
110 See, e.g., Bert Eljera, EqualAccess orDiscrimination?, ASIANWEEK, Oct. 18, 1996, at 12
(discussing whether race-conscious programs increase or decrease Asian Americans' access
to educational and employment opportunities).
Ill See supra note 15 for a description of various methods used in race-conscious
programs.
112 See, e.g., Editorial, How to Improve the Consent Decree, AsiANWEEK, Mar. 26, 1993, at 4
(offering suggestions for effective integration programs in the SFUSD).
Chinese Americans also have a long history of challenging segregated school systems.
See, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 87 (1927) (affirming judgment of the Supreme
Court of Mississippi that because the establishment of separate schools for white and black
students was permissible, the question is no different "where the issue is as between white
pupils and the pupils of the yellow races").
113 See infra Part I.D.4.
1304
2001] TAKING ACCOUNT OF ANOTHER RACE 1305
school district." 4 The Decree was a comprehensive' 5 plan to "elimi-
nate racial/ethnic segregation or identifiability in an), S.F.U.S.D.
school, program, or classroom and to achieve the broadest practicable
distribution throughout the system of students from the racial and
ethnic groups which compromise the student enrollment of the
S.F.U.S.D."" 6 At the time of the Decree, the District had "historically
114 See S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34, 36-37 (N.D. Cal. 1983),
rev'd, 896 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1990). The plaintiffs listed the folIouing practices or policies
that perpetuated a dual school system for white and minority students:
constructing new schools and annexes, leasing private property for school
use, and utilizing portable classrooms in order to incorporate extant resi-
dential segregation into the District; establishing feeder patterns, transfer
and reassignment policies, optional and mandatory attendance zones to sit-
uate children in racially isolated schools; implementing racially discrimina-
tory testing procedures, disciplinary policies, and tracking systems within
schools and classrooms; hiring and assigning faculty and administrative per-
sonnel, and allocating financial resources in a discriminatory manner.
Id. at 37.
For early examples of black schoolchildren challenging racially segregated public
school systems, see People ex ret Kingv. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438,456 (1883), which held that a
black child's challenge to separate schools for black and white students filed because such
segregation was constitutional, and Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209
(1850), which upheld a school committee's authority to create separate schools for black
and white children. Over one hundred years later in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), the Supreme Court finally held that segregated schools are unconstitutional.
115 The plan addressed educational goals for all students, notjust minority students.
See S.F. NAACP, 576 F. Supp. at 49, 52. It involved every school in the district. Sre id. at 53-
54. The plan also covered all aspects of educational and administrative programming. See
i&t at 5354, 57. Fmally, the Decree went beyond the school setting to address external
factors affecting the schools' racial composition. Sce id. at 57-59. It included provisions for
the parties to request that the Defense Department discontinue transporting students from
military bases to private schools. See id. at 57. It also required parties to recommend poli-
ies to local, state, and federal agencies that would help reduce residential segregation
affecting the school's racial composition. See id. at 58-59.
116 Id at 53. This opinion contains a copy of the entire Consent Decree. Id. at 51-66.
In order to remedy widespread segregation, the Decree identified nine racial and
ethnic groups in the district, "Spanish-surname, Other White, Black, Chinese, Japanese,
Korean, Filipino, American Indian, and Other Non-White," and required that "[n]o ra-
dal/ethnic group shall constitute more than 45% of the student enrollment at any regular
school, nor more than 40% at the ... alternative schools." Id. at 53.
Other school districts around the country have used race-conscious admissions as part
of their desegregation plans. See United States v. Bd. of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912, 918-19
(N.D. 11l. 1983) (discussing the use of racial percentages as "a measure of desegregation");
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 540 F. Supp. 399, 402 (D. Colo. 1982) (permitting the use of
racial quotas for some schools within the district); Morgan %. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216,
240-43 (D. Mass. 1975) (describing race-conscious school assignment policies for Boston's
regular and magnet public schools); see also Michael Heise, An Empirical and Constitutional
Analysis of Racial Ceilings and Public Schools, 24 SEroN Ru.. L RE. 921, 9241-28 (1993) (dis-
cussing the impact of racial ceilings upon black students in the Chicago public school
system); Note, supra note 109, at 944-46 (discussing challenges to race-conscious admis-
sions programs in public schools in Boston, Los Angeles, and Maryland); John E. Lee,
Note, The Rise (and Fall?) of Race-Conscious Remedies and "Ben "i Racial Discrimination in
Public Education, 30 SurioLt U. L RE. 153, 164-84 (1996) (discussing the use of race-
conscious remedies in the context of school assignment programs and mandatory busing).
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segregated schools ... including nine 'Hispanic' schools, five 'Chi-
nese' schools, and five 'Black' schools."' 17
Despite objections to the Decree from nonblack racial minority
groups,118 the district court approved its implementation' 19 by ignor-
ing the differences among the District's nonwhite students. 120 The
court reasoned that a plan benefitting all students in general would
also benefit all minority students, despite their divergent needs and
histories.12' Unfortunately, the Decree's effect on Chinese-American
students proved this assumption false.
3. The Evolution of a Race-Neutral Admission Plan
Over time, the Decree's effect caused tensions to rise within the
Chinese-American community. Following national trends,1 22 the
Race-conscious programs in public primary and secondary schools are coming under
increasing attack with mixed results. See Amy Docker Marcus, The New Battleground over
Race and Schools: Younger Students, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1999, at B1. Docker's article re-
viewed pending litigation over these public school programs. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery
County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999) (ruling school district's race-conscious
transfer policy is unconstitutional); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th
Cir. 1999) (finding kindergarten's weighted lottery plan to promote racial and ethnic di-
versity unconstitutional); Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.
1999) (finding race-conscious admissions program of an elementary school operated as a
research laboratory to be narrowly tailored and thus permissible); Wessmann v. Gittens,
160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding admissions policy to be unconstitutional); Capac-
chione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 80 F. Supp. 2d 557 (W.D.N.C. 1999) (awarding
plaintiffs attorney fees and expenses arising from school desegregation case holding
school's race-conscious admissions policy unconstitutional); see also Brewer v. W. Ironde-
quoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 748 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that white student plain-
tiff failed to demonstrate clear likelihood of success in her constitutional challenge of
school district's race-conscious transfer program, citing unclear case law regarding whether
nonremedial state interest of diversity mayjustify race-based programs in the constitutional
context); Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 100 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 (D. Mass,
2000) (finding that Wessmann did not hold that "avoiding racial isolation and promoting
diversity are never permissible"). The court in Brewernoted that recent opinions from the
courts of appeals have not resolved whether "a non-remedial state interest, such as diver-
sity," could "justify race-based programs in the educational context." Brewer, 212 F.3d at
748 (citing Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 704; Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 795).
117 S.F. NAACP, 576 F. Supp. at 49-50.
118 Id. (noting that a Latino advocacy group opposed the Decree because it "addressed
only the specific needs of black students in San Francisco, and.. failed] to address the
need for equal educational opportunities for Hispanic students as well").
119 Id at 51.
120 Id. at 50.
121 Id. at 49.
122 When the Census Bureau released its annual estimates in 1999, Director Kenneth
Prewitt stated that the "estimates show that the number of Hispanics, and the number of
Asians and other racial groups living in the United States has increased substantially during
the 1990s." Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Releases State and County
Population Changes for the Nation's Racial and Hispanic Groups-Substantial Increases
Estimated from 1990 (Sept. 15, 1999), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/1999/
cb99-170.html. Nationwide, the Hispanic population increased by 35.2% and the Asian
population increased by 40.8% between 1990 and 1998. Id.
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SFUSD had experienced a significant increase in its percentage of
Asian-American students since the 1980s.12 Consequently, the De-
cree had a perverse impact upon Chinese-American students' access
to neighborhood and magnet schools. In order to keep the numbers
of Chinese-American students below the forty percent maximum at
Lowell High School,124 for example, Chinese-American applicants
needed a higher test score to be offered admission to Lowell than the
score required for all other students, including white students.'2 The
required admissions scores for students applying to Lowell for the
1993-94 school year were the following- Chinese American (62), white
(58), other nonwhite (58), Spanish surname (53), and black (53).126
Nationally, college campuses also faced increasing numbers of
Asian-American students and experienced an anti-Asian-American
backlash.127 This phenomenon was especially notable in California,
where Asian and other minority populations are rapidly growing.128
Universities instituted programs to reduce the number of Asian-Amer-
ican students and reestablish the number of white students."' Al-
though the purpose of these programs wras distinct from the purpose
of the SFUSD's desegregation program, their effect upon Chinese-
American students was similar.'3 0 Some commentators dubbed this
123 See Patrick Anderson, Asians Approadi Majori, at San Francisco Schaols, AsL%.NWESE,
Apr. 3, 1992, at 16.
124 Gerard Lim, Lawsuit over Chinese Ainrican HS Enrollment: Class 1SWare by the Bay?,
AstasW.Ex, Aug. 19, 1994, at 1 (describing the percentage requirements of the Decree).
125 Id. Lowell used an admissions index based partly upon a sixtynine point standard-
ized test. 1d.
126 1&
127 See.Arthur Hu, Editorial, Hu's on Flrst..., As LWEEr, Sept. 3, 1993, at 17 (describ-
ing universities' adjustment of admissions quotas in response to increasing numbers of
Asian-American students).
128 Press Release, supra note 122. Not surprisingly, California is one of the states in
which Latino and Asian populations have had the highest numerical gains. Id. In fact,
several states, including California, Hawaii, and New Mexico, as well as the District of Co-
lumbia, already have a "majority-minority"; Florida and Texas will soon join this trend. Jon
Meacham, The New Face of Race NEWmE, Sept. 18, 2000, at 38, 40. For a state-by-state
analysis of racial and immigration population statistics, see America 2000: A Map oftheMix,
NEvsw E , Sept. 18, 2000, at 48.
129 See, eg., L Ling-chi Wang, Trends in Admissions for Asian Americans in Colleges and
Universities: Higher Education Policy, in THE STATE op ASIAN PAcic A. muC: PoUcY ISSLtES
TO -ru YEA_ 2020, at 49,52-53 (Don T. Nakanishi &J.D. Hoko)-ama eds., 1993) (discussing
university programs that reduced the numbers of Asian-American students); see also Gabriel
J. Chin et al., Beyond Sdf-Interest: Asian Pacfic Americans Toward a Communi of Justice, a Policy
Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4 AsLaN PAe. A.Ni. LJ. 129, 159-160 (1996) (describing the
policy implications of "negative action," or racial caps, against Asian Americans).
130 See, eg., Lee Cheng, Editorial, Smoke ScreenforInequity, As,.,WEr, Apr. 19, 1996, at
7 (discussing similarities between the Lowell High School policy and a policy at the Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley which reduced its number of Asian-American students); S.W.
Chow, Editorial, Consent Decree Fails Cidnese Americans, AsLANWAEEK. Apr. 9, 1993, at 6 ('Hav-
ing followed [the Lowell High School controversy], I am reminded of my own experience
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national phenomenon "negative action" 13 against Chinese Americans
or "affirmative action . ,. for whites.' 3 2
The challenge to the SFUSD decree began when the Chinese
American Democratic Club (CADC) in San Francisco1 33 established
the Asian American Legal Foundation to "lay the groundwork for a
lawsuit."'1 34 A year later they discovered their plaintiffs. In 1994, five-
year-old Brian Ho was rejected from the 1994-95 entering kindergar-
ten classes in two of San Francisco's elementary schools because these
schools had already accepted their limits of Chinese-American stu-
dents according to the Decree.135 Two other Chinese-American stu-
dents, eight-year-old Hilary Chen and fourteen-year-old Patrick Wong,
had been similarly rejected from their preferred schools. 136
Despite what appeared to be the patent unfairness of the Decree,
it was difficult for the families and the CADC to find an attorney will-
ing to accept their case. 137 The numerous civil-rights and public-inter-
est organizations throughout the San Francisco Bay Area declined to
represent the plaintiffs due to the controversial nature of the case.'-"
Eventually the CADC found two attorneys from a San Francisco law
firm specializing in plaintiff representation in financial and personal-
injury class actions who agreed to represent the plaintiffs and chal-
lenge the Decree. 139 In 1994, the plaintiffs filed a suit alleging that
the Decree constituted a system of racial classification and quotas in
of having been discriminated by an educational system because of my race.... I still
remember the day... with great pain and anger.").
'3' Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability of Thvorldn's
Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HARv. C.R-C.L L. REV. 1, 3 (1996).
132 LisaJ. Hong, Debate RunningDeep over Integration Consent Decree, AsMIWEEx, Mar. 19,
1993, at 28; Joan Walsh, Editorial, A White Mother: Are Asians Smarter than My Kid?, PIIILA.
TmB., Nov. 15, 1994, at 7-A.
133 See Liu, supra note 6, at 343. California Democratic organizations chartered the
CADC in 1957. See CHINESE AMERIucAN DEMOCRATc CLUB, HisTORY AND MissioN, at http://
www.sfcadc.org/history.html (last updated July 1999). The CADC's mission is:
to continue its fight against racial and economic injustice and to increase
the political participation of the Chinese American community. CADC's
vision on improving the quality of life for Chinese Americans may differ
from others in San Francisco. The challenge will be to reinvigorate our
relationships with diverse groups in San Francisco, to be able to disagree
with each other, and still be able to work with each other on matters which
we agree on.
Id.
134 Liu, supra note 6, at 343.
135 Ho ex rel. Ho v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 965 F. Supp. 1316, 1318-19 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
One of these schools was also Brian's neighborhood school. See id. at 1318.
136 Id. at 1319. Patrick had scored a 58 out of a possible 69 on the SFUSD entrance
exam, which would have gained him admission to Lowell if he had been any race other
than Chinese American. See Liu, supra note 6, at 344; supra notes 125-26 and accompany-
ing text.
137 Levine, supra note 5, at 58-59.
138 See id. at 58.
139 Id. at 59.
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violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.140 In 1995, the plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint adding the San Francisco chapter of the
NAACP as a defendant.1 41
In 1999, on the verge of what would surely have been a divisive
trial, the Ho plaintiffs, the San Francisco NAACP, the SFUSD, and
state officials reached a settlement'142 The settlement order elimi-
nated the mandatory racial composition requirements and entered a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the SFUSD from assigning stu-
dents on the basis of race for the 1999-2000 school year.t 43 Although
the district also had to develop a new permanent student-assignment
plan that did not consider race or ethnicity as the "primary or pre-
dominant consideration in determining" admissions, the school could
consider race or ethnicity as it related to a student's language needs
or "otherwise to assure compliance with controlling federal or state
law."' 44 In the fall of 1999, the SFUSD district revealed a plan to use a
diversity index for twenty percent of its admissions openings, and to
consider the race of black and Latino students as one of several selec-
tion criteria. 145 After the school district's announcement, the Lowell
plaintiffs insisted that the SFUSD eliminate any consideration of
race. 46 The final settlement forced the District to adopt a race-neu-
tral plan giving priority to children with enrolled siblings and children
who live near a school or in certain zip codes.147 After Lowell High
School implemented this race-neutral approach, its entering classes
140 See Ho, 965 F. Supp. at 1318-19. Amy Chang, who chaired the CAflC's Consent
Decree Task Force, described the purpose of the suit: "Given that Chinese American stu-
dents don't sue every day, this monumental step is a long time coming.... We are fighting
for the right of parents and children of all races to choose... (I]n our eyes, it's a very
simple civil rights issue." Gerard Urn, SFs Chinese Students le Class Action Suit, AsLWNNV ,
July 15, 1994, at 1 (second omission in original). One black observer of a CADC protest
against the Decree stated, "That's the first time I ever saw angry Chinese." Don Lau, C4DC
Protests Consent Decree at School Board Meeting, AsLANWEVE, Mar. 12, 1993, at 7.
Other commentators provide a more comprehensive discussion of the litigation's legal
proceedings and the substantive law involved in the decision. Se, e.g., Lxvinc, supra note 5;
Dong, supra note 24, at 1034-56 (reviewing school-desegregation, affirmative-action, em-
ployment-rights, and voting-rights case law and analyzing possible constitutional challenges
to the Lowell admissions plan); Liu, supra note 6, at 345-49 (discussing the legal implica-
tions of the case prior to the 1999 settlement); Shin, supra note 3, at 190-222 (analyzing
trends in school-desegregation law and the potential impact of the Lowell case).
141 See S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. DisL, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1024 (N.D. Cal.
1999).
142 Id, at 1025.
143 Id. at 1026-27.
144 Id. at 1025.
145 See Kim, supra note 5; Jason Ma &Joyce Nishioka, SFWUD Otcr mds Mixed Signals
on Race, ASIANWEEK, Nov. 11, 1999, at 12 (noting that tie diversity index considered "four
criteria-family income level, reading and math scores, language proficiency and race").
146 See Kim, supra note 5.
147 See Asimov, supra note 5.
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were almost exclusively white and Chinese-American students. 148 The
resulting resegregation of the SFUSD's schools mirrors the experience
of other institutions when litigation forces them to abandon race-con-
scious remedies. 149
The District adopted its final assignment plan in April 2001 as a
result of the Lowell litigation, the mandate of the original consent
decree, and community concern about education quality. 150 Under
the new plan, the District assigns students "without consideration of
their race or ethnicity except in extreme and rare circumstances in
which race-neutral mechanisms [have failed] and compelling govern-
mental interests warrant[ ] a very limited use of race/ethnicity as one
of multiple factors.' 51 After preference is given to siblings of current
enrollees and students with special educational needs, the school em-
ploys a "diversity index lottery procedure" to select the remaining stu-
dent body at each school. 15 2 Using this procedure, the district:
assigns the seat to the student whose race-neutral diversity profile
(which the District presently defines as including seven characteris-
tics-socioeconomic status, academic achievement, English Lan-
guage Learner status of the students, mother's educational
background, academic performance at the student's prior school,
home-language, and geographic area of San Francisco) will most
enhance diversity at the school.153
This plan, however, does not apply to Lowell. 15 4 The District is still
developing its approach to admissions at Lowell, taking into account
parents' objections to "the current use of academic criteria for admis-
sion" and their "belief that the atmosphere at Lowell is hostile to Afri-
can American and Latino students, and therefore discourages
qualified African American and Latino students from applying" to
Lowell.155
4. The Rationales for Race Neutrality Fail Lowell High School
To address the needs of a highly racially diverse community, the
district court required the SFUSD to evaluate students on an individ-
148 See Guthrie, supra note 7.
149 See, e.g., Barbara Ortutay, Coalition Calls for Repeal of SP-1, 2 at Regents'Meeling, DALY
BRuIN (UCLA), Mar. 2, 2001, at 1 (noting that the enrollment of black students at UCLA
declined 54.5% following the end of the school's race-conscious admissions program),
available at 2001 WL 15554453.
150 See Press Release, San Francisco Unified School District, SFUSD Board Approves
Revised Plan (Apr. 5, 2001), available at http://sfusd.edu/indexl.html (updated Apr. 19,
2001).
151 ExCELLENCE FOR Au, supra note 2, at 14.
152 Id.
153 Id,
154 See id. at 15.
155 Id. at 21.
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ual basis without any state-imposed racial classification. This ap-
proach should have satisfied the Supreme Court's rationales for race
neutrality.156 Yet the court-ordered assignment plan did not avoid dif-
ficult definitional issues,1 57 the litigation reinforced governmental use
of racial stereotypes, 58 and racial tensions increased dramatically as a
result of the assignment plan. This section focuses on the increase in
racial tensions in the SFUSD and questions whether the failure to ful-
fill the rationales for race neutrality raises concerns about the appro-
priateness of a race-neutral approach for resolving interracial conflict.
The use of a race-neutral approach in the Lowell litigation led to
increasing racial animosity among San Francisco's minority communi-
ties. Although the original Decree took into account the racial diver-
sity within the SFUSD,159 the Decree's failure to give legal cognizance
to the divergent, and sometimes conflicting, interests of these groups
triggered deep tensions within the Chinese-American community as
well as between it and other minority communities.
Within the Chinese-American community, supporters and oppo-
nents of the litigation sharply disagreed about whether the interests of
Chinese-American students were consistent with the interests of other
minority groups. Supporters of the litigation viewed the benefit to
other minority groups as the cause of the discrimination against Chi-
nese Americans.1 60 For the CADC, the suit involved rewarding merit
and preventing Chinese-American students from "being forced to
shoulder a disproportionate amount of the educational burden." 6t
Supporters touted the academic superiority of Chinese Americans
156 See supra Part I.B.
157 For many, the SFUSD litigation did not present difficulties with defining the major-
ity and minority races or with clarifying the nature of the remedy as benign or invidious.
The desegregation plan for the SFUSD iwas a model plan that dearly delineated various
racial groups. Unlike the Supreme Court's fear in Batde that no sociological and political
data would be available to evaluate the status of racial groups, see supra note 44, the Lowell
litigation presented a clear picture of the specific racial groups involved and the effect of
the admissions plan upon each group. See S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F.
Supp. 2d 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
158 The court-ordered plan tended to perpetuate the stereotype of Asian Americans,
and Chinese Americans in particular, as a "model minority." Se infra note 167 and accom-
panying text; Levine, supra note 5, at 130.
159 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
160 See, eg., Amy Chang, Editorial, 1O-Year-Old Deece Huiting CMinese AMricas,
AsNIaWVEY, Feb. 26, 1993, at 2 (arguing that the Decree has "resulted in discrimination
against Chinese American students" and urging the Chinese-American community to join
the CADC "and others in demanding that [t]he San Francisco Board of Education end
discrimination against Chinese American children and limited English-speaking
students").
161 Lim, supra note 124.
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over blacks and Latinos as a justification for ending the Consent De-
cree and opposing race-conscious programs.1 62
In contrast, opponents of the litigation, including the San Fran-
cisco-based Chinese for Affirmative Action (CAA) and its executive di-
rector Henry Der, attempted to realign, or alternatively to balance,
the interests of Chinese Americans with those of blacks and Lati-
nos. 63 They criticized the use of litigation as a means of dealing with
Chinese-American students' problems. 164 These critics of the litiga-
tion pointed out that race-conscious remedies also benefit Asian
Americans and Chinese Americans in education and other contexts ' 5
and urged Chinese Americans to resist occupying a "buffer" position
162 See, e.g., Eljera, supra note 110 (discussing an example of "the Chinese American
student who was denied admission to Lowell High School in San Francisco in favor of a
black or Latino who had lower grades"); Arthur Hu, Editorial, A Chinaman's Chance at
Lowel ASLANWEEK, Sept. 24, 1993, at 23 ("After a decade of desegregation, half of blacks in
the school district still get grades worse than a C.... African Americans get half of [the]
suspensions for assault, are nearly half of [the] special education students, and have an
even higher drop-out rate than the Hispanics."); Lucia Hwang, A House Divided: Asian Amer-
icans and AffirmativeAction, THmRD FoRcE, Dec. 31, 1996, at 10 (quoting one Asian-American
community advocate as saying, "You work hard, you get more. You work less, you get
less.... Why should you feel bad for those people? . . . How can I be responsible for
someone who doesn't work hard and is lazy? ... Aren't you the one who didn't study,
going out there every night and dancing?").
163 See Lim, supra note 124. Other opponents of the litigation also pointed out that the
real tension was between Chinese-American and white students. See, e.g., Nanette Asimov,
A Hard Lesson in Diversity: Chinese Americans Fight Lowells Admissions Policy, S.F. CHRON., June
19, 1995, at Al (discussing the admission of white students over Chinese-American stu-
dents with higher scores at Lowell); Adair Lara, Editorial, Affirmative Action at Lowell High,
S.F. CHRON., Apr. 11, 1995, at E6 (acknowledging that white students are experiencing
affirmative action at the expense of Chinese Americans, but supporting diversity as an ad-
missions goal); Frank H. Wu, Editorial, At Lowell High, TWho Is Equal to Whom, S.F. CitoN.,
Sept. 21, 1994, at A23 ("If Asian Americans are hurt by affirmative action at Lowell, It
primarily is by affirmative action not for African Americans but for whites. By requiring
higher scores for Asian Americans than for whites, the school district in effect takes away
from Asian Americans to give to whites.").
164 See, e.g., Gerard Lira, Enrollment at Elite High Schools Continues to Stir Controversy,
ASlANWEEK, Feb. 4, 1994, at 1 (citing Henry Der for the argument that "Chinese students
[under the Consent Decree] experience a greater choice in prospective schools, compara-
ble to that of white students and far greater than African American or Latino students");
Lim, supra note 124 (quoting Henry Der as saying that the plaintiffs "have yet to provide
any evidence of a disproportionate impact [by the Consent Decree] on Chinese students").
165 See, e.g., Diane T. Chin, Editorial, End of Decree Hurts Chinese American Children, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 17, 1999, at A17 (arguing that the end of the Decree will reduce educational
resources and opportunities for limited-English proficiency and low-income Chinese-Amer-
ican students); see also Harvey Gee, Comment, Changing Landscapes: The NeedforAsian Amer-
icans to Be Included in the Affirmative Action Debate, 32 GoNz. L. REv. 621, 638-641 (1996-97)
(describing modem discrimination against Asian Americans in immigration, business, edu-
cation, social life, and political participation). But cf Lance T. Izumi, Confounding the Para-
digm: Asian Americans and Race Preferences, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'v 121,
123, 133 (1997) (arguing that Asian Americans "should welcome the opportunity to be
treated simply as individuals protected by the rights and guarantees of the Constitution"
rather than become "unintentionally created" victims of affirmative action).
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between whites and other minorities. 6 6 Finally, the critics dispelled
the model-minority myth perpetuated by the Lowell ligation. 167
Other Asian-American groups, including Filipino, Japanese,
Vietnamese, and Indian Americans, presented their own claims of dis-
criminatory treatment and underrepresentation. 163 These groups crit-
icized the Lowell plaintiffs and asserted that the litigation weakened
the notion of the Asian-American community as a group ith com-
mon interests.169 In addition, advocates for recent Chinese immi-
grants expressed concerns that the litigation's success could lead to
the loss of up to $37 million in federal desegregation funds and
threaten the availability of resources and educational access for lim-
ited-English proficiency students.' 70
Black and Latino advocates raised claims of present-day and his-
torical discrimination that directly opposed the Lowell plaintiffs' ef-
forts to dissolve the Decree.171 The deep divisions between the black
and Latino community and the Chinese-American community, re-
166 See; eg., Jeff Chang, Teetering on the Fence, A. MAo., Oct./Nov. 1999, at 36, 36 (dis-
cussing how conservatives "began recasting [Asian Americans] as the wedge group" sepa-
rating whites from blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans); Wu, supra note 163 ('Asian
Americans ... are wrong to think that their goals can be achieved by abolishing affirmative
action for African Americans.... Asian Americans should recall that they have been
caught in the middle before and used to advance others' ideological causes."); see also
Alien 0., One Step Forward, Three Steps Bad4 INT'L Exsitw, Aug. 18-31, 1999, at 15 (discuss-
ing the Ho litigation's negative impact upon relations between Asian Americans and other
racial minority groups).
167 See Emil Guillermo, Editorial, On Modd Minorities and Irnmigrant Malteo, M Fiupixo
ExPRFss, Oct. 13, 1996, at 11 (discussing a study finding that Asian Americans "are among
the poorest residents in San Francisco, often at risk [in] both health and education").
168 See; e.g., Venise Wagner, Students Oppose Lowell Suit Deak M3ad; Latino and Filipino
YouthsSay They'reIgnoredin White-AsanDi.pute, S.F. ExA.MINER, Dec. 15, 1999, atDl (discuss-
ing opposition to the SFUSD settlement by black, Latino, and Filipino students).
169 See; ag., Emil Guillermo, Editorial, The Best Tetirns, FiuriNo ExpRass, Mar. 14, 1999,
at 11 (describing how the Ho litigation not only drove a wedge between Asian Americans
and other racial minorities, but also polarized between various Asian-American groups).
170 See Chin, supra note 165 ("The end of the desegregation agreement may make it
easier for middle-class Chinese children to attend Lowell but it takes av, ay resources used
to address the educational needs of low-income children."); Joyce Nishioka, Judge Gives
Final OK to Ending Race Cap AsiANIWEr.u, Apr. 22, 1999, at 12 (quoting Diane Chin of the
CAA as saying that "People think that all Chinese American children are doing well....
But data from the school district shows that limited-English proficient Chinese American
children are near the bottom in terms of grades and test scores."); 0., supra note 166
("The outlook is particularly grim for Asian American students. Among the 61,954 stu-
dents in the district, over 20,000 are children of Asian immigrants who have limited En-
glish language skills. The programs for these children are probably going to be the first to
be cut.").
171 See S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1029-30 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (noting that the defendants' attempts to prove that past governmental discrimina-
tion caused any current problems in the District had largely failed, and recognizing that
the parties sought conflicting remedies).
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flected a long-standing history of distrust and misunderstanding. 17"
Some blacks and Latinos, as well as some Asian Americans, viewed the
lawsuit as a selfish effort benefitting Chinese Americans over other
minorities.173 Although blacks and Latinos did not necessarily view
the Decree as an unequivocal success,' 7 4 the Ho plaintiffs' success re-
sulted in a virtual elimination of black and Latino students from the
Lowell campus,'7 5 while other SFUSD schools reverted back to being
racially identified as black schools or Latino schools.176 As a result of
the Lowell litigation, the distrust between San Francisco's minority
communities continues to deepen. 7 7 In the wake of the Lowell litiga-
tion, many practitioners and scholars are asking whether they can re-
solve future conflicts with an alternative approach within the context
of existing equal protection jurisprudence, or instead whether minor-
172 The tensions between Asian Americans and other minority communities are well
documented. See, e.g., ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXIE
RIENCE 155-58 (1998) (describing conflict between Asian Americans, blacks, and Latinos
over redistricting and protection under the Voting Rights Act); Ikemoto, supra note 102, at
1581-83 (arguing that portrayals of the "Korean American/African American conflict" dur-
ing the 1992 Los Angeles riots pitted minority against minority rather than discussing the
interrelationship between their experiences of white oppression); Yamamoto, supra note
11, at 824-25 (arguing that a victory by the Ho plaintiffs "may well exacerbate African Amer-
ican and Asian American tensions already heightened by negative stereotypes held by some
members of each group about the other, by intergroup economic competition, and by
intergroup justice grievances" (footnotes omitted)).
173 See Yamamoto, supra note 11, at 823-25.
174 See, e.g., Hong, supra note 132 (noting that a local black Democratic club "has
called for the end to the 'policy of unequal schools under the guise of integration'"); Lau,
supra note 140 (quoting a black civil-rights leader as saying that "[bilack children are los-
ing more than what they're getting through the consent decree's integration").
Some legal scholars question whether court-ordered integration is the most effective
solution for African-American students. See, e.g., LURENCE H. TRiBE, AMEPirICN CoNsTrTty-
TIONAL LAW § 16-19, at 1495 n.15 (1988) (discussing the view in the black community that
"predominantly black-populated and black-controlled local schools may better serve black
community interests than will the lengthy and troublesome process of desegregation");
Derrick Bell, Learningfrom Our Losses: Is School Desegregation Still Feasible in the 1980s?, 64 Pkin
DELTA KAPPAN 572, 575 (1983) (questioning whether desegregation addresses black chil-
dren's stigmatic and psychological injuries from segregated schools); Erica J. Rinas, Note,
A ConstitutionalAnalysis of Race-Based Limitations on Open Enrollment in Public Schools, 82 Iowa
L. REv. 1501, 1523 (1997) (summarizing the views of critics of integration who dispute the
presumption that "black children need white children to receive an adequate education");
see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRiNG ABOUT Socxu.
CHANGE? 338 (1991) (arguing that courts are not an effective source of social change).
175 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
176 See Asimov, supra note 2; see also Mary Curtius, S.F Drops Bid to Use Race as Student
Placement Factor, LA. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2000, at A13 (quoting San Francisco NAACP attorney
Michael Harris as predicting that "there will be a number of schools that will have incom-
ing classes that will have extreme racial concentrations").
177 See Yamamoto, supra note 11, at 837-38 ("Amid this morass [of cases like Lowell],
communities of color undermine one another with often thinly veiled insults and pro-
posed settlements that at best paper over unresolved tensions and satisfy no one. Group
wounds, lying just beneath the surface of daily interactions, and larger intergroup power
dynamics go unaddressed." (footnotes omitted)).
2001] TAK[NG ACCOUNT OF ANOTHER RACE 1315
ity communities will inevitably position their interests against one an-
other under constitutional colorblindness.
II
TRANSFORMNG INSIGHTS FROM CgrIcAL RACE PRAXIS INTO
PRACICAL STRATEGIES FOR LITIGATION
Recognizing the inadequacy of constitutional colorblindness to
reconcile minorities' competing discrimination claims, critical race
scholars have begun developing a new approach to achieving interra-
cial justice-"critical race praxis."' 78  Critical race praxis is an ap-
proach that
combines critical, pragmatic, socio-legal analysis with political lawy-
ering and community organizing to practice justice by and for
racialized communities. Its central idea is that racdjustice requires
antisubordination practice. In addition to ideas and ideals,justice is
something experienced through practice.... It requires, in appro-
priate instances, using, critiquing, and moving beyond notions of
legal justice pragmatically to heal disabling intergroup wounds and
forge intergroup alliances. It also requires, for race theorists, en-
hanced attention to theory translation and deeper engagement with
frontline practice; and for political lawyers and community activists,
increased attention to a critical rethinking of what race is, how civil
178 Critical race praxis was recently developed by critical race theorists, Asian legal
scholars, and LatCrit scholars to address interracialjustice and racial equality. SeeJohnson,
supra note 31, at 202-04. Professor Yamamoto first introduced the notion of critical race
praxis in a 1995 article and further developed this praxis in subsequent articles and a
recently published book. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Reldnidng Alliances: Agenty, Raponsibility
and InterracialJustice, 3 Ast PAc. A.ss. LJ. 33, 69 (1995) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Rethinting
Alliances] ("[L]aw and notions of legal justice provide a potentially powerful base for con-
structing merged theoretical and practical, or praxis, approaches to inter-group healing as
well as interracial justice."); see alsoYAMAioTo, supra note 20 (exploring critical race pra.xis
as a means to interracial justice); Yamamoto, supra note 11 (describing a framework for
and the implications of critical race praxis).
Since its formation, critical race praxis has been the subject of numerous journal arti-
des and at least one symposium. See, eg., Tan)a Lovell Banks, Both .dges of the Margin:
Blacks and Asians in Mississippi Masala, Bariers to Coalition Building, 5 Astm,, LJ. 7 (1998);
Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content of Our Characterizations; 5 Mici. J. RIcE & L 53 (1999);
Robert S. Chang, Facing Histoy, Facing Ourselves: Eric Yamamoto and the Quest forJustice, 5
MICH.J. RAcE & L. 111 (1999); Sumi L Cho, Essential Politics, 2 -IuR%. LIn.o L RE,. 433
(1997); Sumi K Cho, Multiple Consciousness and the Ditetity Dilemma, 68 U. COLO. L RE.
1035 (1997); Tayna Kater! Herndndez, "Afultiracial"Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era
of Color-BlindJurispndece 57 MrD. L REv. 97 (1998); Chris K. Iijima, The Era of Wc-Construc-
tion: Redaiming the Politics of Asian Pacific American Identi, and Reflections on the Critique of the
Black/White Paradigm, 29 COLUM. Husm. RTs. L Ray. 47 (1997); Peter K,,an, Complicity and
Complexiy: Cosynthesis and Praxis, 49 DEPAUL L R.v. 673 (2000); Symposium, Nlanoo!, of the
Nomos: A Symposium on Critical Race Praxis, 5 Mic. J. RAcE & L 31 (1999); Eric K. Yama-
moto, Conflict and Gomplicit,: Justice Among Coinmunities of Color, 2 Hrtv. LTx,o L Ra, 495
(1997); Eric K Yamamoto, Healing Our Own, 20 B.C. TmRu Womn LJ. 101 (2000); Harvey
Gee, Perspective, Beyond Black and White: Seleed Writings lt
' 
Asian Americans i7thin the Crti-
cal Race Theoy Afovement 30 ST. MArs LJ. 759 (1999);.
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rights are conceived, and why law sometimes operates as a discursive
power strategy.1 7 9
Critical race praxis literature crosses the boundaries between the law
and other disciplines, including history, public policy, political sci-
ence, religion, sociology, and psychology. 180 It involves bringing ra-
cial communities together to learn one another's histories and
present circumstances, offer apology and reconciliation, and discover
connective relationships. 181 In pursuing this emerging interdiscipli-
nary approach, scholars sometimes neglect the relationship between
critical theory and legal practice, 8 2 perhaps due in part to critical the-
orists' disillusionment or frustration with the limited capacity to fur-
ther social justice through legal efforts. 18 3
This Note asserts that critical race praxis must consistently em-
phasize the necessity of bridging the gap between critical race theory
and legal practice. Although the law is not the exclusive tool with
which to achieve interracial justice, nor perhaps even the most effec-
tive one, it is too pervasive an institution impacting too many lives for
critical race theory to neglect. Critical race praxis offers civil-rights
attorneys and their plaintiffs practical, concrete strategies for imple-
menting critical race theory in actual litigation. This Part first identi-
fies some key ideals of critical race praxis. It then suggests three
practical strategies for implementing these ideals when minority plain-
179 Yamamoto, supra note 11, at 829-30.
180 E.g, YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 153-71.
181 E.g., CHANG, supra note 26, at 127-32; YAMAmoTo, supra note 20, at 50-59, 172-209.
182 Significantly, Professor Yamamoto has not neglected the practical application of
critical race praxis. Professor Chang notes that Professor Yamamoto's recent book, Interra-
cialJustice "is the culmination of several years of activist lawyering and academic writing,"
and that Professor Yamamoto, perhaps more than most law professors, has "been able to
blend theory and practice in his activism and in his writings. He is the embodiment of the
race praxis for which he advocates. In his book, Professor Yamamoto shares the lessons he
has learned. The challenge for us and this nation is to listen." Chang, supra note 178, at
114 (footnote omitted); seeYAMAMoTo, supra note 20.
As part of his thinking and practice concerning racial reparations and apology, Profes-
sor Yamamoto "participated on the legal team that pursued comm nobis petitions to over-
turn the convictions of Gordon Hirabayashi, Fred Korematsu, and Minoru Yasui, who were
convicted of violating various measures enforcing the exclusion and internment of Japa-
nese Americans during World War II." Chang, supra note 178, at 114 n,17; see also Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding conviction of American citizen of
Japanese descent under discriminatory wartime laws), error coram nobis granted by 584 F.
Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding
conviction of American citizen ofJapanese descent for violation of discriminatory wartime
curfew), error coram nobis granted by 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Yasui v. United States,
320 U.S. 115 (1943) (same). See generally Eric IL Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited-Corectling
the Injustice of Extraordinary Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review. Time for a Better Accom-
modation of National Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1 (1986)
(discussing the petition process and the larger concern of government accountability to
civil liberties).
183 See ROSENBERG, supra note 174; Johnson, supra note 31, at 228.
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tiffs present equal protection challenges to race-conscious programs.
As the Lowell litigation demonstrates, interracial conflict is one of the
most divisive experiences for minority communities and among the
most formidable obstacles to the achievement of interracial justice.
A. Critical Race Praxis
Critical race praxis seeks to heal interracial tensions between mi-
nority groups while simultaneously challenging structures of systemic
racism. Despite the "all-over-the-map feel" of much of the literature
on critical race praxis, 84 this Note identifies the key aims of an emerg-
ing jurisprudence for interracial justice. These aims include an em-
phasis on antisubordination practices, the necessity for political
lawyering, and a focus upon the educative function of litigation.
1. Antisubordination Practice
Critical race praxis unites racial groups around the central notion
"that racial justice requires antisubordination practice" rather than
the achievement of gains for a particular individual or racial group
through the application of race-neutral doctrine.'85 Antisubordina-
ion practice seeks "to disrupt the use of law as an instrument for per-
petuating hierarchical power relations."18 6 Critical race praxis
184 YAMAwOTO, supra note 20, at 47 ("Perhaps this all-over-the-map feel to the few arti-
cles on interracial jurisprudence simply means that interminority jurisprudence is in its
early stages, but perhaps it indicates scholarly ambiv-alence. Still another explanation...
maybe political. Discussion of interracial conflict is considered taboo."). ProfessorYama-
moto provides a bibliography of literature on interracialjurisprudence in his book, Interra-
cidJustice. See id. at 289 n.59 (citing Sumi K. Cho, Korean Americans vs. African Americans:
Conflict and Construction, in READING RODNEY KING/RFADING URN UPRISING (Robert Good-
ing-Williams ed., 1993); Paul Brest & Nfiranda Oshige, AffirnativeAdionfor MlIGm?, 47 STA.'€.
L REv. 855 (1995); Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism:
Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Cotflkct in an Inmigration-Drihn Multiracial So dy, 81
CAj. L. RE, 863 (1993); Hing, supra note 29; Ikemoto, supra note 102; Charles R. Law-
rence IlH, Foreword" Race, Multiculturalism, and theJurispntdence of Transformation, 47 STN. L
REV. 819 (1995); Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Bla: and lite
Anymore, 47 STAN. L REv. 957 (1995); Reginald Leanon Robinson, "The OtherAgainst It~sf':
Deconstructing the Violent Discourse Between Korean and African Americans 67 S. G.. L RE%,.
15 (1993); Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 178; Dong, supra note 24; Natapoff,
supra note 11.
185 Yamamoto, supra note 11, at 829; see CHAoNG, supra note 26, at 130; Julie A. Nice,
Equal Protection's Antinomies and the Promise of a Co-Constituthie Approach, 85 Cop-w.N L RE-.
1392, 1394 (2000). Professor Nice describes the choice between pursuing antisubordina-
tion goals and assimilation goals as "[t]he fundamental question underl)ing the equal pro-
tection mandate." Nice, supra, at 1394. An assimilation approach urged by more
conservative scholars "leads to ignoring the distinguishing trait-taking a so-called color-
blind or gender-neutral position-and endorses a standard of sameness for all classes
within a classification." it. at 1394-95.
186 Nice, supra note 185, at 1395.
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continues to advance the critical race theory position that race-neutral
equal protection doctrine maintains systemic racial inequality.8
2. Political Lawyering
Critical race praxis calls for lawyers to play a more active role in
working with their minority clients to shape and guide antidiscrimina-
tion litigation.'88 It also encourages lawyers to situate individual law-
suits within a broader political strategy to achieve interracialjustice. 8 "
Political lawyering could involve "bringing lawsuits as part of a com-
prehensive impact strategy,"'190 "politicization of a trial to obtain pub-
licity for a case or cause," 191 or community organizing and lobbying
the legislature. 192 Although "the role of the attorney seeking social
change through the law is an extremely difficult one,"193 the strategies
discussed below demonstrate how political lawyering can advance crit-
ical race praxis as part of a comprehensive approach for achieving
interracial justice.
3. Educative Function of Litigation
Implicit in the notions of interracial justice advanced by critical
race praxis is the educative function of litigation. Under this theory,
litigation may increase awareness of the court and parties alike about
the interdependence of the legal rights of opposing minority litigants
as well as the distinctions between their historical and current exper-
iences of racial subordination. Professor Yamamoto, for example, em-
phasizes that minority groups experience shifting relationships to one
another: "[A] n actor may be oppressed within one context, [and] may
therefore make justice claims against those with power over that actor
in that context," yet "may also be oppressive in another context, and
may therefore be responsible for the justice claims of those over
whom it exerts power."194
Courts have repeatedly allowed Asian Americans to serve as a
buffer between whites and blacks or Latinos during conflicts over
race-conscious remedies due to misperceptions about the status of
Asian Americans as a "model minority." Litigation may allow parties
to challenge the model-minority myth and encourage Asian Ameri-
187 See supra Part I.C.l.
188 E.g., Yamamoto, supra note 11, at 830.
189 SeeJohnson, supra note 31, at 214-15.
190 Id. at 214.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 228.
194 Yamamoto, supra note 11, at 892.
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cans to support affirmative action programs. 19 5 Professor Frank Wu
has written extensively on the model-minority myth and the attempts
to use Asian Americans as a "wedge group" against other minorities in
the context of affirmative action. 196 He notes that "liberals... treat
affirmative action as if it benefits all racial minorities... , but such a
tactic brings only a temporary respite.... [T]hey fail to address the
tensions among racial minority groups-which should not be exagger-
ated or exacerbated by external forces, but which do exist. " 197 By em-
phasizing the educative function of litigation, critical race praxis helps
to challenge the use of the model-minority myth to align Asian Ameri-
cans' interests in opposition to those of blacks or Latinos.
B. Practical Litigation Strategies for Implementing Critical Race
Praxis
This subpart introduces three practical strategies for political law-
yers198 seeking to achieve interracial justice through critical race
praxis. Although not all lawyers support an antisubordination ideal of
equal protection doctrine, 199 political and progressive lawyers striving
to implement critical race praxis need the tools to negotiate a case
such as Lowell. This subpart suggests strategies to assist a political lav-
yer facing a potential client who is a minority and seeks to challenge a
race-conscious remedy. This Note presumes that a political lawyer us-
ing these strategies could responsibly persuade some, but not all, of
these potential clients to refrain from seeking to invalidate an entire
race-conscious program.
Before discussing the specific strategies, a caveat is necessary. A
number of commentators point out the ethical concerns raised by the
notion of "political" or "critical" lawyering.200 The primary concern
195 See Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor Wh7it&e Asian Americans and Affirmative Aclion, 15
B.C. THiD WoRL L.J. 225, 227 (1995) ("[A]lthough there are many real issues that result
from the dramatically changing demographics of the country, ie dilemma of Asian Ameri-
cans and affirmative action should be understood as an issue which has been manufac-
tured for political gains [by opponents of affirmative action]."). However, in the Ho
litigation, the Chinese-American plaintiffs initiated the conflict, which affirmative action
opponents later coopted. See infra note 216. Professor Wu does not address a solution for
the very real interracial conflicts at the heart of the Lowell case.
196 Theodore Hsien Wang & Frank H. Wu, Bqiond the Modd Minori" Mth, in THE Ar-
FImRATIVE ACraoN DaEakTE 191 (George E. Curry ed., 1996) (discussing the benefits Asian
Americans receive from race-conscious programs and criticizing the model-minority myth).
197 Wu, supra note 195, at 280-81.
198 See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause LauDyering and the Reproduction of Profes-
sionalAuthority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LW%,-ERG: Pourzn'u CoMMrr1,FxTs AD PRoMS.
sIoNAL RzsPoNsImLrnEs 3, 3-7 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) (contrasting
political and conventional la'yering).
199 See, eg., Levine, supra note 5 (stressing the need for race-neutral methods ofachiev-
ing equity and fairness).
200 See, e.g., GEmA P. LOz, REBELuOUS LxvEiuNG: ONE CHxic.NO'S VIszO'% OF PRO-
cREssrva LAw PRacTricE 74 (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Ract-ing an Eide of Justshe, 51
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revolves around a lawyer's duty to zealously represent her client rather
than to seek to conform her client's wishes to her own political
agenda.201 Many question whether the traditional zealous advocate
model is appropriate for public interest law.20 2 As an alternative ap-
proach, advocates of political lawyering argue that current ethical
rules "lend support to the lawyer who encourages a client to pursue a
strategy that is less likely to damage race relations-even if that strat-
egy will not yield the greatest pecuniary result or swiftest relief for the
client."203
STAN. L. REv. 935 (1999); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning
Lessons of Client Narrative 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2145-46 (1991); Naomi R. Cahn, Representing
Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95 MicH. L. REv. 965, 994-1000 (1997);John 0.
Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Laryering at the Intersection of
Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FoRDHnmx L. REv. 1927, 1956 (1999); Hing, supra note 29, at 904
(proposing new ethical guidelines that "would impose a duty on lawyers involved in racially
charged disputes to inform their clients of options for resolution that would be less likely
to fuel racial tensions"); Johnson, supra note 31, at 217-27; Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My
ClientZ: The Role Confusion ofaLawyerActivis, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1996); Sarat &
Scheingold, supra note 198, at 7-8; Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit:
Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 544-45 (1987-88);
David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 Mn.
L. REv. 1502 (1998).
201 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that "[a]s advocate, a lawyer zealously
asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system." MODEL RuLEs o"
PROF'L CoNDucr pmbl. (1999); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPoNSI1ILITn' EC 7-19
(1983) ("The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the same: to
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.").
202 E.g., Hing, supra note 29, at 927-30 (discussing criticism of the zealous advocate
model by scholars and courts, including Louis D. Brandeis, Talcott Parsons, Duncan Ken-
nedy, and Robert Gordon).
203 Id. at 920. Professor Hing discusses a number of rules which place a duty upon a
lawyer to provide her client with advice concerning moral, political, or social factors rele-
vant to the client's circumstances. Id. at 920-22. For example, Rule 2.1 of the ModelRules of
Professional Conduct states that "[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not
only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and politicalfactors, that
may be relevant to the client's situation." MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 2,1 (1999)
(emphasis added), quoted in Hing, supra note 29, at 921. The comment to Rule 2.1 notes
that
[I] egal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client
may be disinclined to confront. ...
Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to a client,
especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on otherpeople,
are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inade-
quate It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical consider-
ations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such,
moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may deci-
sively influence how the law will be applied.
A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical ad-
vice. When such a request is made by a client experienced in legal matters,
the lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a request is made by a
client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as
advisor may include indicating that more may be involved than strictly legal
considerations.
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Although a more complete analysis of these ethical considera-
tions is beyond the scope of this Note, the following discussion pro-
ceeds from the presumption that current ethical rules permit a critical
lawyer to educate her client about the political and social considera-
tions in cases involving minority challenges to race-conscious pro-
grams with the hope that this information will persuade her client to
choose a less detrimental course of action. This Note acknowledges,
however, that a client possesses the final decision regarding what ap-
proach to pursue, and a lawyer must continue to zealously advocate
on behalf of her client once representation has begun regardless of
her client's decision.
1. Formative Questions for Attorneys and Their Clients
This Note proposes a series of formative questions for attorneys
to explore with minority clients wishing to challenge race-conscious
remedies. These questions should assist attorneys in helping these cli-
ents to identify the specific practices they wish to challenge and in
educating the clients about the consequences of their choices. After
stating each formative question, this Note explores the purpose of the
question and its role in forming the theory of the case and selecting
litigation strategies.
Professor Hing has suggested a similar approach that would func-
tion within his proposed ethical guidelines.20 4 He would require law-
yers involved in cases with potential racial tension to "complete a form
and questionnaire indicating whether less antagonistic options exist
and describing these options."205 The purpose of Professor Hing's
proposals "is to require the lawyer to sit down and discuss with the
client the possible negative effects on race relations that the immedi-
ate pursuit of certain options may have."206 As a result, lawyers may
persuade their clients to exhaust nonadversarial options before engag-
ing in an adversarial approach or, if the client pursues an adversarial
approach, to at least postpone or reduce the racial tensions in the
case.207 The formative questions proposed below focus on specific is-
sues a lawyer may explore during client counseling to educate a client
about the potential personal and social impact of various courses of
action.208
Id. cmt. (emphasis added), quoted in Hing, supra note 29, at 921 n.101.
204 See Hing, supra note 29, at 917-22 ("We need [ethical] rules that obligate lawyers
and clients to attempt to settle disagreements through nonadversafial procedures first.").
205 Id at 918.
206 Id. at 919.
207 Id
208 See L6PEz, supra note 200, at 74 ("When the aim to educate itself becomes a core of
any acceptable notion of providing sound help, familiar practices like intervielwing, coun-
seling, planning, negotiating, and litigating take on a different look and feel.").
2001] 1321
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
In many respects, these questions focus less upon litigation strat-
egy and more upon raising the client's awareness of systemic racial
inequality with the ultimate goal of encouraging the client to pursue
antisubordination litigation rather than personal redress under color-
blind equal protection doctrine. This Note envisions attorneys relying
on these questions when preparing to meet with clients who intend to
challenge a race-conscious remedy using colorblind equal protection
doctrine. By reviewing the substance of these questions with their cli-
ents, attorneys might successfully diminish the negative impact of
cases such as the Lowell litigation. It is essential to note, however, that
many attorneys will require assistance in implementing the strategies
contained in these questions. Many cities have professional diversity
trainers or facilitators skilled in training multicultural groups.20 - Just
as an attorney might engage the assistance of other professionals
when a client presents issues outside the attorney's medical or scien-
tific skill level, for example, this Note encourages attorneys to seek the
assistance of skilled professionals when engaging in an effort to pro-
vide their clients with accurate historical or sociological information
or when professional multicultural mediation skills are necessary.
What is the overall position of the minority group in society? What is
the relationship between the plaintiffs minority group and other mi.
nority groups that might oppose the litigation?
By exploring with clients the position of their minority group
within society, an attorney may be able to dispel race-based stereo-
types, such as an Asian-American family's belief in the model-minority
myth, or to identify an area in which the potential plaintiffs might
benefit from race-conscious remedies. This question might provide
an opportunity for a minority plaintiff to understand how she as an
individual-and her racial or ethnic group as a whole-is simultane-
ously in a position of subordination relative to whites as well as a posi-
tion of domination over other racial or ethnic groups.2 10 An attorney
may need to rely upon newspaper reports, history, and statistics to
overcome entrenched myths of Asian Americans' success and the per-
ception that blacks and Latinos are the source of barriers to opportu-
nity for Asian Americans. Here, the lawyer's role is to raise her
client's consciousness of the historical, political, and social terrain
upon which the suit will play out.
* Have the plaintiffs communicated with members of racial groups lihely
to oppose the litigation?
In today's racially segregated society, it is not uncommon for peo-
ple to form their racial perceptions without ever speaking to one an-
209 See Peralte C. Paul, Diversity Training: From Churches to Classrooms, Industry Grows,
ATLANTAJ. & CONsr., Oct. 5, 2000, at IF.
210 SeeYamamoto, supra note 11, at 891.
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other about race, racial identity, racism, and equality.21' In many
respects, this question seeks to explore the client's own prejudice
prior to the formation of a lawsuit. If a community attorney can facili-
tate an introductory conversation or workshop among parents, chil-
dren, or community members, it could ease the desire of the minority
plaintiff to completely eliminate a race-conscious program. Personal
accounts of the program's beneficial impact for others or the barriers
faced by others could motivate the plaintiffs to present a more narrow
challenge to the program.
* Is the client aware that a successful challenge to a race-conscious pro-
gram in one context may lead to the elimination of a similar program
in another context? Does the client universally oppose race-conscious
remzedies or is the client upset about a specific loss of opportunity?
Does a race-neutral approach offer the client a "quick fix"?
Many minority plaintiffs may not be aware of the broader legal
impact of a successful attack upon a race-conscious program.2 2 Some
may believe that their challenge to a specific program will not have an
effect upon other race-conscious programs that benefit the plaintiffs
in other settings. Explaining in accessible terms the idea of equal pro-
tection and the role of precedent may help a client understand that a
successful challenge to a program in one context, for example a
school's admission program, will provide support for a similar chal-
lenge in another context, such as hiring or promotion policies in a
workplace. 213 A progressive lawyer may find that the time spent dis-
cussing the potential impact of the case in other contexts will lead the
client to reconsider a broad attack on a race-conscious program.
This phenomenon may partly explain the CADC's position con-
cerning the Lowell litigation and race-conscious programs in general.
Although the CADC provided organizational support and was the im-
petus for the challenge to the SFUSD assignment program,21 4 the or-
ganization simultaneously supported the use of race-conscious
programs for the allocation of government contracts because these
211 See, eg., Beverly Daniel Tatum, TaUing About Race, Learning About Radsm: The Appli-
cation of Racial dentiy Development Theory in the Classroom, 62 H,%v. EDLVC. RE%. 1. 5 (1992)
(noting that racism is a taboo topic in racially mixed settings).
212 Any first-year law student who has been exposed to concepts of collateral estoppel,
stare decisis, and resjudicata realizes the complexity behind understanding the binding
effect and influential impact of a holding that may not be apparent to the average
layperson.
213 See; eg., City of Richmond v.JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493-94 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (relying in part upon Bakk/ a case considering race-conscious admssions in
higher education, to invalidate a race-conscious program for a.arding government
contracts).
214 See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying texL
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programs benefitted Chinese Americans. 215 The CADC was taken
aback when state and national leaders opposed to all race-conscious
programs embraced the Lowell litigation as part of a universal fight.216
In response, the CADC took the untenable position of selectively op-
posing only the SFUSD's use of race-conscious admissions pro-
grams. 21 7 In future situations, progressive lawyers may be able to use a
client's willingness to support other race-conscious programs as a win-
dow of opportunity for explaining the importance of narrowing the
challenge to a program with a disparate effect on some minority
groups.
Finally, for those who question the wisdom of lawyers spending
their time educating clients on race relations and history, the Lowell
litigation provides a compelling reason for investing this time prior to
litigation. It took communities of color, state courts, and federal and
national education experts nearly twenty years to achieve the model
desegregation consent decree for the SFUSD. In only five years, three
individual plaintiffs returned the district to nearly identical racial
215 See Norman Matloff, Editorial, Lowell High Plaintiffs Want It Both Ways, S.F. CtUoN.,
Dec. 8, 1994, at A29 (stating that the GADC cannot "have it both ways" ith affirmative
action); 0., supra note 166 (criticizing the CADC for "send[ing] the wrong message that
Asian Americans will fight for equality and equal access only when it benefits them").
216 Even supporters of the litigation, however, began to express discomfort when Call-
fornia Governor Pete Wilson, an opponent of race-conscious programs, embraced the suit
as an attack on "the 'perversity of the affirmative-action mind-set.'" Alethea Yip, New Sup-
port in Scwol Desegregation Case, AsitANWEE.K, Sept. 11, 1997, at 10. The president of the
CADC, Roland Quan, responded, "Our group has never been for dismantling affirmative
action and in fact we are supportive of affirmative action.... But many groups have tried
to piggyback on our case and interpret it to fit their agendas.... [Tihis case is about
ending discrimination and not at all about ending affirmative action." Id.; see also Hwang,
supra note 162 (describing how anti-affirmative action politicians coopted the Lowell con-
troversy for their own political agendas). Ward Connerly, a prominent African-American
opponent of race-conscious programs, also supported the litigation as a means to end af-
firmative action. See Ward Connerly, Editorial, Race Has No Place in School Admissions Poli.,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 26, 1999, at A21.
217 One Asian-American magazine editorial chastised the CADC for maintaining a con-
tradictory policy regarding race-conscious programs:
[H]ow can it be fair for the city to give breaks to Asian American business-
men because they for years were shut out of networks and capital, then
refuse such considerations to African American youngsters ... ?
... While it is discomforting to think about a Chinese American applicant
rejected in favor of a Latino or black applicant with slightly lower test
scores, it should be no less a perceived injustice to see than a well-funded
white construction company getting rejected for an Asian American firm
whose bid was counted as 10 percent less than it actually was under the
minority business ordinance.
Fair is fair. If one is the solution, the other must be, too. To maintain
otherwise is to advocate only for ourselves-a dangerous position that, if
taken by all minorities, will weaken our hard-won gains.
Editorial, The Parity Problem, ASIANWEEK, Feb. 18, 1999, at 4.
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demographics that the schools experienced in the 1960s.2 18 Commu-
nities of color cannot afford this "progress."
2. Selecting the Challenged Practice Using Antisubordination
Principles
Political lawyers or progressive clients may also implement critical
race praxis by shifting the focus of the suit from an effort by the plain-
tiffs to secure for themselves public educational opportunities that are
not available for many students into an effort to challenge the limited
availability of these resources. One example of this antisubordination
litigation model is a recent suit that the ACLU of Southern California
filed on behalf of four African-American and Latino students, Daniel v.
California219
Although the suit does not challenge a race-conscious program, it
alleges that the students "are being denied equal and adequate access
to Advanced Placement ("AP") courses by the State of California and
by the State's local school districts."220 According to the complaint
filed by the plaintiffs' high-profile attorneys,221 Beverly Hills High
School and Arcadia High School, two predominantly white and Asian-
American schools,2 22 offer fourteen and eighteen AP courses, respec-
tively.223 At Arcadia, the eighteen AP academic subjects provide "45
AP classes to hundreds of students."224 In contrast, according to the
complaint, predominantly black and Latino high schools offer signifi-
cantly fewer AP courses.2 25 For instance, Inglewood High School
(97.4% black and Latino) and Arvin High School (92.8% black and
Latino) offer only three and two AP courses, respectively.226
The suit was brought in response to the University of California
Board of Regents' decision to abandon their race-conscious admis-
sions program after the passage of Proposition 209.227 While aban-
doning their race-conscious program, the Board maintained their
218 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
219 Complaint, Daniel v. California, No. BC214156 (Cal. Super. Ct. filedJuly 27, 1999).
available at http:// wv.aclu-sc.org/docs/ap-comp.pdf [hereinafter Daniel Complaint].
220 Id. 11.
221 The plaintiffs are represented by the ACLU of Southern California, Johnnie L
Cochran, Jr., and Eric G. Ferrer. See id.
222 Beverly Hills High School and Arcadia High School have 8.8% and 8A% black and
Latino students, respectively. Id. 12.
223 Id.
224 Id. 15.
225 Id. 111.
226 Id. 12 chart 1.
227 See Inglewood High School Minoyij, Students File Suit Against State, LA. Ssrt'nNEL, Aug.
4, 1999, at Al (quoting ACLU plaintiffs' attorney Mark Rosenbaum stating that "[t]he
lausuit, which is 'the first of its kind in the nation,' is a case 'about the underbelly of
Proposition 209,'" the California referendum that "ended affirmative action programs in
state and local government, hiring, education, contracting and housing").
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system of preferences for students who have completed AP courses in
their high schools. 228 As a result of these decisions and differences in
the availability of AP classes in California high schools, a facially race-
neutral admissions policy systematically disadvantages black and La-
tino students by reducing their access to more intellectually challeng-
ing courses and thus their ability to gain acceptance to the University
of California's public universities. 229 For example, the 1998 appli-
cants to UCLA "had an average high school GPA of 4.19 (on a 4.0
scale), which is achievable only as a result of having taken many AP
classes." 230 In addition, students admitted to UCLA "took an average
of 16.8 AP and honors-level courses in high school."23' The Daniel
plaintiffs allege that this favorable admissions policy towards high-
school students completing AP courses, combined with the relative
unavailability of AP courses in predominantly nonwhite secondary
schools, placed black and Latino students at a disadvantage in gaining
access to the California public university system.232
The plaintiffs seek on behalf of themselves, and for their pro-
posed plaintiff class, 233 that all qualified students have reasonable ac-
cess to AP courses.234 The court entered a stay in the case while the
parties attempted to reach a settlement.2 35 During the stay and settle-
ment negotiations, the ACLU's team of educational experts lobbied
the California legislature for changes in the distribution of AP
courses.236 The combination of litigation and political action created
sufficient pressure and attention to compel the enactment of legisla-
tion creating the Advanced Placement Challenge Grant Program.25 7
The program provides for four-year grants of up to $30,000 to 550
228 In 1984, the University of California began "rewarding extra grade points" for stu-
dents who completed AP classes. Louis Sahagun & Kenneth &. Weiss, Bias Suit Targets
Schools Without Advanced Classes, LA. TIMES, July 28, 1999, at Al; see also Daniel Complaint,
supra note 219, at 23 ("The University of California automatically raises by one point the
GPA of its prospective students for every AP class that they took. For example, if a student
receives a A-, or a 3.5, in an AP class, the grade in that class is recorded as a 4.5.").
229 AMERICAN CVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF SOUTHERN CQMIFORNIA, SAMPLE OF CASES ON
OUR DocKET. Daniels v. State of California, at http://Nwv.aclu-sc.org/litigation/
cases.shtml (last visited Apr. 27, 2001) [hereinafter ACLU, CAsEs ON OUR DOcKET]; see also
Daniel Complaint, supra note 212, 4-10 (discussing the University of California admis-
sions policy regarding AP courses).
230 Daniel Complaint, supra note 212, 1 20.
231 Id.
232 See id 16, 20.
233 In their complaint, the plaintiffs seek certification for a class "consist[ing] of all
current and future California public high school students who are being denied by virtue
of defendants' policy and practice, equal and adequate access to AP classes." Id. 35.
234 See ACLU, CASES ON OUR DocKEr, supra note 229.
235 See id.
236 Id.
237 See CA. EDUC. CODE §§ 48980(m), 52247 (West Supp. 2001); Valerie Small
Navarro, Crucial Votes on AP Classes, DNA and Police, ACLU Nms,July/Aug. 2000, at http://
vs.aclunc.org/aclunews/news42000/sacto-report.html.
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high schools to use for AP course development.-8 Although both the
Northern and Southern California ACLU organizations had sought
much broader changes,2 9 the Challenge Grant Program is a struc-
tural change that improves educational access for black and Latino
students as well as low-income students of all races.
Similarly, in Rios v. Regents of thw University of California, an interra-
cial coalition is addressing the same problem with the University of
California's admissions preference from a different angle.2 40 In Rios,
a group of African-American, Latino, and Filipino-American students
filed a class-action lawsuit in federal district court alleging that "U.C.
Berkeley's undergraduate admissions process violates federal civil
rights laws."24' In addition to the named plaintiffs, a number of mi-
nority and civil rights organizations joined this litigation, including
the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the Asian Pacific Amer-
ican Legal Center of Southern California, the Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, the ACLU Foundation of
Northern California, the NAACP Oakland Imani Youth Council, the
California League of United Latin American Citizens, and the
Kababayan Alliance, an organization of Filipino high school
students.242
The plaintiffs challenge a number of UC Berkeley's admissions
policies that disproportionately disadvantage minority students. 43
The plaintiffs address the same issues present in Daniel, but at the uni-
versity, rather than the high-school, level. The plaintiffs argue that
238 CAL. Enuc. CODE § 52247.
239 See Navarro, supra note 237; ACLU, CasEs ON OUR DocKEr, supra note 229.
240 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Rios v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., No. CV 99-0525 SI (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Rios Complaint], availa-
be at http://wvi.aclunc.org/discrimination/ucb-brief.html.
241 Minority Students Sue U.C. Berkey for Discritnination: Admissions PAr?'as Wheates Federal
Civil Rights Laws, ACLU NEWs, Mar./Apr. 1999 [hereinafter Minorit Studlents Sue U.C. B:e-
ley], at http://vv.adunc.org/aclunes/neis299/admissions.huml.
242 See Rios Complaint, supra note 240.
243 The Rios Complaint states:
Defendants' current admissions process discriminates against Litino, Afri-
can American, and Pilipino American applicants in several respects, includ-
hag, but not limited to, the following: it grants unjustified preferential
consideration to applicants who have taken certain courses that are less ac-
cessible in high schools attended largely by African American, Latino, and
Pilipino American students. It also encourages and allows admissions of-
ficers to place undue and unjustified reliance upon standardized test
scores.... Even the policy's provision for the admission of students w ho
fail to meet academic eligibility requirements, called "admissions by excep-
tion," has been implemented by Defendants to disproportionately favor
white applicants.
2001] 1327
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
U.C. Berkeley's current process ... gives enormous preferences to
students who take Advanced Placement, or AP, courses.... [M]any
schools with high concentrations of African Americans, Latinos and
Pilipino Americans have no AP courses at all. Rewarding applicants
with slightly higher SAT scores who had access to AP courses simply
because of where they attended high school doesn't reward merit, it
rewards privilege.2 44
The suit seeks to enjoin the university's existing admissions process.214
As in Daniel, the ACLU of Northern California combined these litiga-
tion efforts with political lobbying for passage of the Advanced Place-
ment Challenge Grant Program 2 46
The Daniel and Rios suits evince a distinct move towards critical
race praxis, unlike the Lowell litigation. These suits seek to interrupt
the systemic inequality that developed out of a history of residential
segregation, and that was reinforced through historical employment
segregation and racial discrimination that limited upward mobility.2 47
By providing additional points for affluent schools, the university sys-
tem's facially race-neutral admissions standard reinforces the continu-
ing legacy of segregated housing that has resulted in a lack of equal
opportunity and resources for many minorities.2 4 These suits inter-
rupted this systemic discrimination by denying rewards for the privi-
lege of attending an affluent school.
The suits have also facilitated interracial healing by bringing to-
gether diverse organizations with mutual interests.2 49 Rather than be-
coming trapped by competing claims of racial discrimination, the
Daniel and Rios plaintiffs seek structural change of an unequal system.
They want to alter facially race-neutral policies-the additional admis-
sions points for AP classes and the distribution of AP classes through-
out the state's schools-that preserve privilege derived from historical
discrimination. In addition, although both suits acknowledge the pre-
sent racial inequality between white and Asian-American students on
the one hand, and black and Latino students on the other, neither
group of plaintiffs has positioned its claims in direct opposition to the
Asian-American students' access to AP courses or their admission to
the UC colleges. This tactic avoids the difficulties of competing claims
244 Minority Students Sue U.C. Berkeley, supra note 241 (quoting NAACP attorney
Kimberly West-Faulcon).
245 See Rios Complaint, supra note 240.
246 See ACLU, CASES ON OuR DocKEr, supra note 229.
247 See supra Part IIA.1 (discussing antisubordination practice's goal of interrupting
systemic inequality).
248 See Harris, supra note 64, at 1746; see also S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 576
F. Supp. 34, 58-59 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (including provisions in desegregation consent decree
to address the continuing impact of residential segregation affecting public schools' racial
composition), rev'd, 896 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1990).
249 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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of discrimination or unequal access present in the Lowell litigation.
The Daniel and Rios plaintiffs defined the contours of the litigation as
a means to create equality for all California students, not to benefit
one particular group.250
The plaintiffs in the Lowell litigation also could have framed
their litigation in a manner that promoted educational equality for all
students in the school district Throughout the political and legal
struggle in the SFUSD, CAA's Henry Der articulated a vision of the
conflict that was similar to the Daniel and Rios plaintiffs' fiaming of
their own litigation. Rather than seeking more opportunities solely
for Chinese-American students within the existing admission sys-
tem,251 CAA, like the Rios plaintiffs, challenged the exclusionary struc-
ture of the admission system itself.252 In the midst of the Lowell
litigation, CAA proposed a "combined achievement/lottery system"
for Lowell that would place students who scored above a cutoff score
between 50 and 55 out of a possible 69 on the standardized basic skills
test in a pool from which the school district would select students for
Lowell at random.25 3 By randomly selecting students from a broader
eligible pool, students from a variety of backgrounds would have more
opportunity to attend Lowell.
It would have been difficult for the plaintiffs in Lowell to adopt a
stance similar to the Rios plaintiffs without completely reversing the
premise of their suit. Unlike the litigants in Rios who were dispropor-
tionately excluded from admission to the UC schools, the Lowell
plaintiffs experienced discrimination based on their success under the
current admissions system. Thus, the Lowell plaintiffs were not only
invested in the current means of evaluating merit, they sought to have
restrictions upon that system-the use of race-conscious admissions
criteria-removed to allow more Chinese-American students to gain
admission.
The Lowell plaintiffs, however, could have adopted a position
similar to that of the Daniel plaintiffs by seeking an increase of educa-
tional opportunities. The CAN addressed the "outcry for quality
250 See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (describing the plaintiffs' proposed
class).
251 See Lim, supra note 124.
252 See ia; see also CHINESE FOR AFIRMtTVE Amao, EoucxrTo. PRoGm.t (2001), at
http://www.caasf.org (last visited May 2, 2001) [hereinafter EDLTrro. Pnoonm.MJ (CAA
has consistently advocated for policies that both promote integrated educational environ-
ments and provide high quality education for public school students of all racial, linguistic
and economic backgrounds.").
253 Lim, supra note 124. A similar lottery system ias already in place for every SFUSD
alternative school other than LowelL I& CAAs Henry Der argued that the "test does not
even measure analysis, so that the difference between a student who scores a 59 and an-
other who scores a 64 is practically negligible. There's nothing magical about these point
scores." Id
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schools and more educational choices in the district" by advocating
for the District to create additional academic high schools. 2 4 CAA
began working with SFUSD in 1994 to transform the troubled Galileo
High School into the Galileo Academy of Science and Technology.2r 5
Galileo, unlike Lowell High School, is not designated as an alternative
school with exclusionary admissions criteria, but instead gives prefer-
ence to the largely "high-risk and limited-English-speaking students"
living in the school's surrounding Tenderloin and Chinatown neigh-
borhoods.256 The Lowell plaintiffs could have similarly challenged
the systemic discrepancies between the educational resources availa-
ble at different schools within the District.2 57 Rather than attempting
to give even more Chinese-American students access to Lowell, the
plaintiffs could demand that SFUSD create additional schools that
provide students with similar high-quality education.
The final admissions plan SFUSD adopted in April 2001 had a
policy approach very similar to that of CAA. 258 The school district
articulated the objectives of its new plan as "first, to eradicate existing
segregation and all traces of past segregation in SFUSD's schools, pro-
grams, and classrooms, and second, to improve academic excellence
for all students, but particularly students whose performance has
lagged behind others."259 In the end, CAA's vision of unifying efforts
to desegregate with efforts to improve educational opportunities for
all students prevailed over the Lowell plaintiffs' narrow effort to
achieve individual gains.260
Although the Lowell litigation forced SFUSD to reevaluate its as-
signment plan, the 2001 plan contained its dual objectives in spite of,
rather than because of, the approach the Lowell plaintiffs adopted.
254 EDUCATION PROGRAM, supra note 252.
255 See id
256 Mamie Huey, Galileo High School to Become Premier Academic Instilution, ASiANWEEK,
Feb. 10, 1995, at 5.
257 Consistent with the Daniel plaintiffs' concerns, supra notes 220-26 and accompany-
ing text, black and Latino students in the SFUSD had less access to advanced placement
and honors classes than other students:
High schools with low African American and Latino enrollment (where the
combined enrollment of these two groups was just 12-13%) offer their stu-
dents an average of 29 AP or honors courses. High schools with high Afri-
can American and Latino enrollment, however, offered just 5 AP and
honors courses on average.
EXCELUENCE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 4; see also id. at 9-15 (discussing strategies for address-
ing the lack of equity in the allocation of resources throughout the district).
258 See id. at 2, 14-15.
259 Press Release, supra note 150.
260 Lee Cheng, vice chairperson of the CADC's Educational Reform Task Force, stated
at one point that if Lowell were to become 80% to 90% Chinese American, "it would not
necessarily be a bad thing. Chinese Americans have been so oppressed in the past that for
us to achieve that sort of level, one that would be temporary because of changing
demographics, would be quite an accomplishment" Lim, supra note 124.
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One can only speculate that had the Lowell plaintiffs adopted an ap-
proach similar to the Daniel plaintiffi, a great deal of additional re-
sources, time, and effort would have been directed earlier toward
securing greater opportunities for all the students in the district. The
plaintiffs' actual approach, however, caused SFUSD to lose ground in
several significant areas.261
3. Benefitting from the Educative Functions of Briefs and Legal
Memoranda
Professor Yamamoto and others have suggested one practical
strategy for implementing critical race praxis in litigation: incorporat-
ing a "critical inquiry into the interminority dynamics at the heart of
the case" in the "legal filings, oral arguments, and court rulings."262
Yet, David Levine, who served as an attorney for the Lowell plaintiffs,
later wrote that it is unlikely that the federal district and appellate
courts considering the Lowell case "would have been particularly
moved by" such briefs and motions in light of the Supreme Court's
colorblind doctrine.263 Although the proposed educative approach
might not challenge the premise of colorblindness, it could offer
judges an account of minorities' present-day experience of the ves-
tiges of discrimination, which, in turn, could justify the use of race-
conscious remedies for particular minorities consistent with a color-
blind framework.
An enormous knowledge gap exists between the daily impact of
racial prejudice upon the lives of minorities and the judicial or social
perception of the degree to which vestiges of historical racial discrimi-
nation still permeate the lives of minorities today. Increasingly, chal-
lenges to race-conscious programs succeed because the institutions
defending these programs cannot satisfy the evidentiary burden nec-
essary to establish the present-day effect of historical or present racial
discrimination. 264 The challenges brought by minority plaintiffs such
as the Lowell plaintiffs serve to reinforce the perception that racial
discrimination no longer harms "good" minorities. Because many le-
gal professionals are unaware of the differences in the history and dy-
namics of racial subordination of particular minority groups, it is
easier for courts to treat all minorities as a uniform group. Courts
thus conclude that if a program harms one minority group-for in-
stance, Chinese Americans-then it must be harmful to all minority
groups.
261 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the litigation
upon admissions offers from Lowell given to black and Latino students).
262 YAMiA OTO, supra note 20, at 32.
263 Levine, supra note 5, at 137-38.
264 Se, e.g., supra note 54 and accompanying text
20011 1331
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
An alternative approach using critical race praxis would use legal
filings as an educational opportunity to provide judges with historical,
social, political, and cultural information about various minority
groups in the United States and their diverse histories of racial subor-
dination. In a sense, this strategy seeks to transform the literary narra-
tive in much of the critical race scholarship into a legal presentation
of information beyond the knowledge and experience of many
nonminority legal professionals.265
Over time, these efforts could succeed in creating a broader
knowledge among legal professionals about the various historical and
present-day impacts of racial discrimination upon different minority
groups. Ultimately, this could provide a court with the ability to per-
ceive the necessary evidence to mandate a remedial program for some
minority groups and abandon the remedy for others, an approach
courts have yet to adopt.2 66 The Lowell litigation presented an ideal
opportunity to employ this strategy. 'The school district had well-docu-
mented information regarding the lingering effect of vestiges of his-
torical discrimination upon the present-day status of black and Latino
students, as wel as how this effect was distinct from the experiences of
upper- and middle-class Chinese Americans who had overcome the
effect of historical discrimination in the educational context. Had tie
SFUSD presented its case in a manner that supported the continuing
use of race-conscious admissions for black and Latino students, the
court may have been willing to stretch beyond a binary paradigm and
permit remedial race-conscious programs appropriate for particular
racial groups.
CONCLUSION
We've got the rights. But we've got no justice.2 67
Racial minorities in the United States have the right to formal
equality, but racial justice has remained elusive. Critical race theory
scholarship and the plethora of critical literature following in its wake
emerged from the social and political movements both within and
outside of law schools as formal equality cracked open the doors to
265 See CHANG, supra note 26, at 64.
266 This assertion rests upon the assumption that the evidentiary basis for a remedial
justification would exist if a court uses a broader understanding of racial discrimination
that incorporates a historical understanding of race. Often, courts will hold that racially
segregated schools are the result of irremediable "societal discrimination" in the absence
of explicit and deliberate discriminatory acts by the government. See, e.g,, Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971). Through litigants' repeated use of
an educative approach, courts may someday recognize that the status of black and Latino
students is due to more than vague "societal discrimination," but is, in fact, due to tile
present-day impact of discriminatory state and local policies that have gone unremedled.
267 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 70 (quoting Alice Aiwohi).
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what was once an exclusively white (and male) legal profession.2' Yet
much of this literature remains embedded in the language and con-
text of academia, far removed from the challenges of today's civil-
rights litigation. This Note urges critical scholars to pass back through
those doors and transform the visions of critical race praxis into prac-
tical tools for political lawyers struggling to realize racial justice.
Emerging controversies over school desegregation and educa-
tional reform provide an opportunity for critical race praxis to expand
the availability of race-conscious programs permissible under current
equal protection jurisprudence. Arguably, primary and secondary
school admissions provide a more fertile ground for successful race-
conscious programs because opponents' merit-based arguments are
less compelling when students are young and have had less opportu-
nity to accomplish achievements or skills that distinguish one student
from another.2 69 With the issue of merit less predominant, courts will
face the question of whether the historical use of state racial classifica-
tions-for example, discriminatory lending practices that created en-
trenched residential segregation 270-still contributes to the present-
day status of disadvantaged minority children in our public schools.
This creates an opportunity for courts to revisit a historical definition
of race that incorporates the varied histories of racial minority groups
and the vestiges of discrimination that still remain.
Most importantly, this impending litigation will involve the multi-
racial demographics that define our country's future. As racially di-
verse generations of children move through secondary school, seek
college admissions, and enter the workforce, courts will increasingly
face equal protection challenges with complex interracial dynamics.
Rather than ignoring the legacy of racial subordination that shadows
these conflicts by embracing colorblind doctrine, critical race praxis
offers litigants and attorneys a strategy for achieving racial justice in a
multiracial society.
268 See Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Critical Race Coalitions: Ke Afovenents that Performed
the Theoy, 33 U.C. DAvis L REv. 1377 (2000) (discussing the history of critical race theory's
emergence in legal academia).
269 See Note, supra note 109, at 955-56. But ef. supra notes 122-36 and accompan)ing
text (describing the merit-based arguments some parents used tojustify their desire to end
race-conscious admissions programs in the SFUSD).
270 See eg., Sugrue, supra note 86, at 280-81.
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